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Presidential Power in Comparative
Perspective:
The Puzzling Persistence of Imperial
Presidency in Post-Authoritarian Africa
by H. KWASI PREMPEH*
In December 1991, the president of the southern African state of
Zambia, "on behalf of the nation," declared his country a "Christian
Nation."1  Remarkably, President Frederick Chiluba made this
declaration without consulting his cabinet, party, or the national
legislature.2 A self-described evangelical Christian, President Chiluba
simply imposed his own religious preferences on his entire nation,
ignoring the fact that Zambia has been a secular state since its
founding in 1964 and remains a culturally and religiously pluralistic
society. Against the objections of influential sections of the Zambian
polity and society, including well-established Christian congregations,
the president stood by his declaration and, in fact, succeeded in 1996
in getting it memorialized in the form of a "Christian Nation clause"
inserted in the preamble to the country's amended Constitution,
where it still sits today.
What is significant about this story is that the Zambian
president's declaration was not the act of some notorious "African
dictator" whose word had always been law. To the contrary,
. Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. J.D., Yale Law
School. I would like to thank Professor Stephen Kwaku Asare, University of Florida
(Gainesville), for his helpful comments on a draft of this article and Eliot Dorazio, Seton
Hall Law School Class of 2009, for outstanding research assistance. Research for this
article was supported by the Seton Hall Law School Faculty Development Fund.
1. The full text of the speech by Zambian President Frederick Chiluba containing
the "Christian Nation" declaration is reproduced in THE NATIONS CALLED: THEOLOGY
OF THE NATIONS AND THEIR REDEMPTION (Pieter Bos ed., 2002).
2. GERO ERDMANN & NEO SIMUTANYI, TRANSITION IN ZAMBIA: THE
HYBRIDIZATION OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC 13 (2003).
3. ZAMBIA CONST. (Constitution Act 1991) (as amended in 1995).
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President Chiluba was one of a "new generation" of African leaders
recently swept into office amidst popular disenchantment with
decades of autocratic one-man and one-party rule. A former trade
unionist and a political newcomer, Chiluba had been elected
president at the head of a democratic movement that had emerged
purposely to resist and challenge the 27-year rule of Zambia's
founding leader Kenneth Kaunda. However, upon assuming office as
president, the democratically elected Chiluba showed himself to be
no less authoritarian, and arguably even more so, than his
predecessor. The regime change that was supposed to have ended
presidential autocracy in Zambia had ironically brought more of the
same.
Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, popular protests and growing
civic activism have challenged the rule of once-entrenched dictators
since the end of the 1980s. In several of these countries, this
democratic "wave'" has led to unprecedented political liberalization
and constitutional reforms. In the process, some of Africa's longest-
serving and most notorious autocrats have been brought down5 and
many more forced by new constitutional rules to face the prospect of
electoral defeat or foreseeable exit through presidential term limits.
The democratic turn in Africa has helped to revive and restore civil
government to so-called "failed states"6 like Liberia 7 and Sierra
Leone.' Thanks also to democratic politics, Africa now boasts its first
elected woman president9 as well as a woman prime minister."
4. See generally Samuel P. Huntington, Democracy's Third Wave, in THE GLOBAL
RESURGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 3 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 2d ed. 1996)
(describing the "current era of democratic transitions" as constituting "the third wave of
democratization in the history of the modern world.").
5. See, e.g., Editorial, Malawi Freed From Its Liberator, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1994, at
20.
6. The term "failed state" is used in contemporary discourse to refer to a juridically
sovereign state where, usually as a result of protracted civil war, the central authority has
collapsed or lost the capacity to enforce or project its power over large portions of the
country's territory, effectively ceding control of such territory to local bandits or insurgent
groups. Foreign Policy magazine, which first used the term "failed state," publishes an
annual Failed State Index, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com.
7. See generally JOHN PETER PHAM, LIBERIA: PORTRAIT OF A FAILED STATE
(2004).
8. See Michael Chege, Sierra Leone: The State that Came Back from the Dead, 25
WASH. Q. 147 (2002).
9. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was sworn in as president of Liberia in January of 2006,
following her victory in the presidential elections of November 2005. See African First for
Liberian Leader, BBC NEWS, Jan. 16, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4615764.stm.
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However, despite the recent democratic backlash against decades of
authoritarian presidential rule in Africa, and the regime change this
has wrought in several African states, the phenomenon of "imperial
presidency,"" long associated with politics and government in
Africa,12 persists. Indeed, across the globe, as democratic government
has spread, notably since the end of the Cold War,13 presidential
power has tended to assume an imperial character. 4 Yet, while
constitutional and comparative legal scholars have shown a
tremendous amount of interest in new constitutional courts in the
world's newest democracies,15 the contemporaneous phenomenon of
persistent imperial presidency has been largely overlooked.
10. Luisa Dias Diogo was appointed Prime Minister of Mozambique in February 2004,
after serving for five years as her country's Finance Minister. See BBC News, Brazing a Trail
for African Women, Nov. 23, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4428434.stm.
11. The term was coined and popularized by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., to describe
"the shift in the constitutional balance" in the United States in favor of "presidential
supremacy," which has come about through "the appropriation by the Presidency, and
especially by the contemporary Presidency, of powers reserved by the Constitution and by
long historical practice to Congress." ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY viii (1972). Throughout this Article, I use the phrase "imperial presidency"
interchangeably with "presidential supremacy," "presidential imperialism," "hegemonic
presidency," "presidential monarchy," and "presidential dominance." In parts of this
Article, I also use the phrase "presidential autocracy" as a more robust variant of imperial
presidency, describing a form of presidential rule where formal checks and balances,
instead of merely being weakened, are simply non-existent dejure.
12. See, e.g., H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions without Constitutionalism:
Reflections on an African Paradox, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY:
TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 74 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993)
(identifying "imperial presidentialism" as a distinctive feature of postcolonial rule in
Africa).
13. See Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771
(1997).
14. See, e.g., CARNES LORD, THE MODERN PRINCE: WHAT LEADERS NEED TO
KNOW Now 96 (2003) ("[T]he general trend in democracies today seems to be in the
direction, if anything, of a further strengthening of the executive element, especially at the
expense of legislatures."); Gary Rosen, The Time of the Presidents, N.Y. TIMES, July 16,
2006, at 6-21 ("Around the world, the imperial presidency appears to be alive and well.")
In the United States where the term originated, presidential imperialism has received a
boost recently in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and resulting "war
on terror" declared by President George W. Bush. See generally ARTHUR M.
SCHLESINGER, JR., WAR AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY (2005). The phenomenon
has been observed even in "parliamentary" Britain, where recent prime ministers, notably
Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair, have been noted for "presidentializing" a traditionally
cabinet government. See, e.g., GRAHAM ALLEN, THE LAST PRIME MINISTER: BEING
HONEST ABOUT THE UK PRESIDENCY (2002).
15. See generally THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (C. Neal Tate &
TorbjOm Vallinders eds., 1995).
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This Article examines the phenomenon of imperial presidency in
a region of the world-sub-Saharan Africa-that has been almost
entirely ignored by scholars of comparative constitutionalism. 6 In
part, Africa's relative exclusion from comparative discourses stems
from a widespread belief in the notion of "African exceptionalism"'7
which is "the idea that the problems that plague Africa are uniquely
African"'8 and thus must be analyzed without reference to "universal
categories of explanation."'9 Regarding Africa's tradition of imperial
presidency, for example, a common tendency is to blame it on
"African culture," or more specifically, Africa's indigenous kingship
tradition.' On that view, the imperial president in modern Africa is
regarded merely as a contemporary or secular version of the
traditional African "chief" writ large.2'
This Article challenges and refutes the "African culture" thesis.
Instead, it seeks explanation for the phenomenon of imperial
presidency and for its persistence in post-authoritarian Africa, first, in
aspects of the postcolonial history and evolution of the African state;
and, second, in aspects of contemporary constitutional design and
politics in Africa's new democracies. The Article thus seeks to do
two things: Examine and explain, one, the rise of imperial presidency
16. See Mary L. Dudziak, Who Cares about Courts? Creating a Constituency for Judicial
Independence in Africa, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1622, 1630 (2003) (book review) ("Amidst the
blossoming of comparative scholarship, most of the continent of Africa is usually
overlooked, as if it were a legal 'Heart of Darkness,' as if it were a lawless world."). The
exception is South Africa, whose post-apartheid constitution and constitutional court have
become a favorite of sorts for comparative constitutional scholars-an exception that fosters
a sense of "South African exceptionalism" within Africa.
17. C.R.D. Halisi & Scott Bowman, Theory that Matters: The Intellectual Legacy of
Richard L. Sklar, in AFRICAN POLITICS IN POSTIMPERIAL TIMES: THE ESSAYS OF
RICHARD SKLAR lxi (Toyin Falola ed., 2002).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., JAMES T. MCHUGH, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS
140 (2002) ("The role of the 'strong leader' is consistent with a traditional perception of
tribal leadership that is familiar to many people throughout this region of Africa .... The
traditional political role of the Nigerian president ... may be based more firmly upon
traditional cultural expectations than upon the powers and institutions . . . that are
expressly linked to that office.").
21. See, e.g., id.; B.O. NWABUEZE, PRESIDENTIALISM IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA
106 (1974) ("The President, in effect, is the chief of the new nation, and as such entitled to
the authority and respect due by tradition to a chief."); Bethwell Ogot, From Chief to
President, 10 TRANSITION 26, 28 (1963) (explaining authority in postcolonial Africa in
terms of the "traditional model" of chieftaincy).
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in Africa, and two, the persistence of the phenomenon in the post-
authoritarian 22 African state.
In Part I of this Article, I present a portrait of the nature of
presidential power in Africa during the first three decades after
colonialism, roughly from 1960 to the end of the 1980s. I then
proceed to describe how recent democratic and constitutional reforms
have altered the constitutional and political contexts of presidential
rule in contemporary Africa and, consequently, why the persistence
of imperial presidency in Africa presents a puzzle. In Part II, I
examine, and ultimately refute, the claim that Africa's longstanding
tradition of presidential autocracy or supremacy is the modern
reflection of indigenous modes of rule. In Part III, I trace the rise of
imperial presidency in Africa to Africa's first postcolonial rulers. I
identify independent Africa's first nationalist ruler, Kwame Nkrumah
of Ghana, as the progenitor of the trend toward presidential
autocracy in postcolonial Africa and examine briefly the incremental
steps by which imperial presidency was implanted in Africa's first
sovereign state and then popularized across the region. I also discuss
in Part III the "national integration" and "development" rationales
that were proffered in support of presidential autocracy and the
historical and external factors that conditioned or influenced
postcolonial agency in that direction. Finally, in Part IV, I return to
the present era to examine why Africa's presidents, despite recent
counter-authoritarian constitutional reforms, continue to be so
overwhelmingly powerful. I focus on contemporary constitutional
politics and design in Africa and identify the presidentialist
orientation of contemporary Africa's political parties and the force of
"path dependency" among the main factors that continue to
underwrite the tendency toward presidential imperialism in Africa.
Though the prospect of "divided government" has a certain allure as
a remedy for presidential imperialism in contemporary Africa, I reject
it as too fraught with the danger of political instability and
governmental paralysis in the particular context of Africa's unitary
states. Instead, I offer, within the context of the discussion in Part IV,
some tentative constitutional reform proposals to mitigate the
identified problems.
22. I use the term "post-authoritarian" in this Article as a period marker, to denote
the period after a transition from formal authoritarianism to a formal democratic form of
government under new constitutional rules.
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I. The African Presidency in Transition: From Presidential
Autocracy to Constitutional Democracy
A. Portrait of an African President, 1960-1990
On March 6, 1957, the date marking the independence of Ghana,
the country's founding leader published his memoirs under the title
Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwarne Nkrumah." Nkrumah's choice
of title, with its bold suggestion of "l' tat c'est moi, 24 may have
seemed immodest or presumptuous at the time. But as time would
reveal, it was indeed quite prescient. Presidents would come to
personify their states not only in Nkrumah's Ghana, but throughout
independent Africa. As Senegal's President Leopold Senghor
observed at the time, "[t]he president personifies the Nation as did
the Monarch of former times his peoples. The masses are not
mistaken who speak of the 'reign' of Modibo Keita [Mali], Sekou
Toure [Guinea] and Houphouet-Biogny [C6te d'Ivoire], in whom
they see above all, the elected of God through the people."25 While
Senghor's observation was easily true of Africa's founding
generation, presidential omnipotence would remain a distinctive
feature of African politics through successive generations of leaders,
both soldier and civilian.
Unlike the monarchs of medieval Europe, however, Africa's
postcolonial leaders did not claim an entitlement to rule on the basis
of divine right, although their propagandists did not shy from
occasional suggestions of divine appointment. 6  By and large,
presidential supremacy in postcolonial Africa was constitutionally
sanctioned.2 The president shared power with no one. Parliament,
where one existed, was under the de facto or de jure control of the
president's party, and its primary purpose was to provide a faqade of
23. KWAME NKRUMAH, GHANA: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF KWAME NKRUMAH
(1957).
24. Meaning "I am the State," the boast is attributed to the seventeenth century
French monarch Louis XIV (1643-1715).
25. Quoted in MARTIN MEREDITH, THE FATE OF AFRICA-FROM THE HOPES OF
FREEDOM TO THE HEART OF DESPAIR: A HISTORY OF FIFrY YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE
162 (2005).
26. See, e.g., Peter G. Forster, Culture, Nationalism, and the Invention of Tradition in
Malawi, 32 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 477, 483 (1994) (noting that President Kamuzu Banda of
Malawi "allowed/encouraged his image as a kind of Messiah to be built up by younger
nationalists" and citing a reported comment by a Banda minister comparing the president
with God and Malawi with Heaven).
27. See NWABUEZE, supra note 21, at 104-35.
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institutional and procedural propriety to the president's decrees.
Legislative initiative was a presidential monopoly, and in many states
the president had concurrent power to legislate by fiat.' Important
policies intended to have legal effect were routinely announced by the
president without prior recourse to the legislative process. African
presidents controlled slush funds not subject to parliamentary
oversight and often awarded major public works and procurement
contracts on their own accord.29 A nominally separate judiciary
completed the formal tripartite structure of the government. But
Africa's courts could operate free of presidential control only in
routine matters carrying no political import or consequence. Judges
whose decisions challenged the omnipotence and official infallibility
of the president were liable to be dismissed or have their decisions
reversed. °
Presidential tenure was open-ended. The president was entitled
to stand re-election an indefinite number of times. The elections, of
course, were political nonevents, as the president generally stood
unopposed and thus faced no credible prospect of defeat. Only in
one instance, of a total of sixteen (nominally) contested presidential
elections held across Africa from 1960 to 1989,"' did an incumbent
president suffer defeat (and leave office accordingly)." Many African
presidents simply dispensed with all pretense of electoral
accountability and held on to power indefinitely or made themselves
"president for life." "
The preponderant and unaccountable power of the president
within the African state (and society) had obvious implications for the
nature and quality of constitutionalism in postcolonial Africa.
African states had constitutions, to be sure-a long succession of
them, in fact. But invariably these were constitutions of power
(presidential power, that is), not of restraint. In general, provisions in
Africa's post-independence constitutions concerning the formal
28. Id.
29. MEREDITH, supra note 25, at 182-83.
30. For example, President Nkrumah of Ghana summarily dismissed the chief justice
after a three-judge panel headed by the chief justice acquitted the lead defendants charged
with conspiring and attempting to assassinate the president. Nkrumah then pushed
through a bill that declared the court's verdict null and void, paving the way for a new trial
that resulted in the conviction of the defendants.
31. Daniel N. Posner & Daniel J. Young, The Institutionalization of Political Power in
Africa, 18 J. DEMOCRACY 126, 131 (2007).
32. Id.
33. See NWABUEZE, supra note 21, at 126-27.
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organization and distribution of political power ("the power map") 34
tended to reflect or follow (rather than condition) actual practice.
And whenever regime needs changed or embarrassing gaps
developed between actual or intended practice and the formal
constitutional text, as happened occasionally, the executive easily and
quickly secured passage of conforming amendments to the
constitution.35 A wider gap tended to exist, however, between
assurances contained in constitutional "bills of rights," or provisions
ostensibly restraining the use of power, and their actual
implementation. Aided by a "jurisprudence of executive
supremacy' '36 applied by the courts, bills of rights became, in practice,
"bills of exceptions."37 The African constitution, then, became an
instrument for the legitimization of presidential autocracy, not a
limitation of it.
Kenyan legal scholar Okoth Ogendo has coined the apt phrase
"constitutions without constitutionalism" 38 to describe the apparent
paradox, evident in the first three decades of African independence,
of a commitment on the part of Africa's postcolonial elites to "the
idea of a constitution,, 39 on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a
"rejection of the classical notation of constitutionalism. 40 On their
part, Africa scholars Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, concluding
that presidential rule in Africa is restrained not by formal or
institutional rules but by certain extraconstitutional and informal
relations of exchange and mutual dependency between the ruler and
34. See generally IVON D. DUCHACEK, POWER MAPS: COMPARATIVE POLITICS OF
CONSTITUTIONS (Peter H. Merkl ed., American Bibliographical Center-Clio Press, Inc.
1973).
35. For example, in 1996 the Kenyan authorities amended the country's constitution
to bring it in conformity with its Preservation of Public Security Ordinance by the addition
of a clause which read, "nothing contained in or done under the authority of any provision
of... the Preservation of Public Security Act shall be held to be inconsistent with or in
contravention of [this constitution]." NWABUEZE, supra note 21, at 320.
36. H. Kwasi Prempeh, A New Jurisprudence for Africa, in THE GLOBAL
DIVERGENCE OF DEMOCRACIES 260, 266 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 2001)
("A jurisprudence of executive supremacy regards the 'state' (personified in an
omnipotent chief executive), not a supervening constitution as the source, juridically
speaking, of all 'rights' and 'freedoms"').
37. Kathurima M'inoti, Why the Kenyan Bill of Rights Has Failed, EXPRESSIONS
TODAY (Nov. 1998) (cited in Prempeh, supra note 36, at 265).




his political 'clients,'4' advised students of African politics who wished
to understand the "central characteristics and dynamics" of politics in
Africa to "read Machiavelli or Hobbes than the 'constitutions,'
official plans, or party programs of most African governments."42
Jackson and Rosberg popularized the term "personal rule" to
describe the highly personalized nature of presidential rule in Africa.
B. The Presidency in the Emerging African Democracy: Transition
Without Change?
The above portrait held true for nearly all of Africa for at least
the first three decades following independence. Since the end of the
1980s, however, the political context of presidential rule in Africa has
experienced significant, sometimes dramatic, change. Across Africa,
noncompetitive one-party and one-man rule has suffered a loss of
popular and intellectual legitimacy, a result of the unrelenting social,
economic and political costs of three decades of authoritarianism.
Popular reaction against the status quo expressed itself first and most
dramatically in the West African state of Benin,43 whose long-serving
dictator, Mathieu K6rkou, was forced by months of street protests
and strikes to yield to demands for a "National Conference."" Once
convened, the National Conference wrestled power away from the
president; it abolished the one-party regime, transferred the powers
of government to an interim prime minister, and authorized the
drafting of a new democratic constitution, which was later approved
in a national referendum.5 Similar transitions from presidential
autocracy to constitutional democracy, though not in nearly as
dramatic or as quick a fashion as Benin's, took place across Africa
over the course of the 1990s.4
As a result, single-party parliaments and presidents-for-life no
longer dominate the political map of Africa. Competitive elections
41. ROBERT H. JACKSON & CARL G. ROSBERG, PERSONAL RULE IN BLACK
AFRICA: PRINCE, AUTOCRAT, PROPHET 10-12 (1982).
42. Id. at 267.
43. See Larry Diamond, Introduction, in DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA xxiv (Larry
Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1999).
44. Id. at ix.
45. See Bruce A. Magnusson, Testing Democracy in Benin: Experiments in
Institutional Reform, in STATE, CONFLIC'r, AND DEMOCRACY 217 (Richard Joseph ed.,
1999).
46. See generally MICHAEL BRATrON & NICOLAS VAN DE WALLE, DEMOCRATIC
EXPERIMENTS IN AFRICA: REGIME TRANSITIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
(1997).
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for legislative and presidential office, once a rarity in Africa, are now
regular occurrences. Currently, over 95 percent of the presidential
elections in Africa are contested-in the 1960s only in two of twenty-
six presidential elections held in Africa did a sitting president face an
opponent.47 More important, "African presidents today are more
than twice as likely to lose power if they subject themselves to
contested elections than they were before 1990."
The growing prospect of defeat through competitive elections is
only one of the many new realities that Africa's presidents must now
face. Constitutional reforms accompanying the democratic transition
in several African states have introduced important new changes to
the political landscape and power map. 9  Notably, traditional
legislative and oversight functions have been restored to Africa's
now-representative and multi-party parliaments," while new
constitutional courts, or pre-existing supreme courts, have been
emboldened by constitutional guarantees of independence and
judicial review authority.5 Africa's political authorities also must now
contend with critical reporting and commentary from a newly
assertive private media. 2 Where once there was only a state-owned
or government-controlled broadcaster or press, now, in many
democratizing African states, multiple privately-owned independent
press and electronic media houses publish and broadcast critical news
and commentary that will have been suppressed as seditious only a
few years ago. A growing number of democracy and governance
focused nongovernmental organizations are similarly revitalizing
Africa's civil society and opening new avenues for the mobilization
and expression of civic activism.
47. Posner & Young, supra note 31, at 130.
48. Id. at 131. See also GORAN HYDEN, AFRICAN POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 20 (2006) ("[S]ince the early 1990s... being voted out of power is an
increasing possibility. Eighteen heads of state have lost elections and been replaced by
someone else.").
49. Posner & Young, supra note 31, at 131 ("Since 1990, more than three dozen
African countries have adopted new constitutions ....").
50. See E. Gyimah-Boadi, The Rebirth of African Liberalism, in DEMOCRATIZATION
IN AFRICA 41 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1999) ("The new liberal
constitutions [in Africa] have substantially improved the legal and political status of
parliaments by equipping them with greater powers.").
51. See generally H. Kwasi Prempeh, Marbury in Africa: Judicial Review and the
Challenge of Constitutionalism in Contemporary Africa, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1239 (2006).
52. See H. Kwasi Prempeh, Africa's "constitutionalism revival": False start or new
dawn 5 INT'L J. CONST. L. 469,490-91 (2007); Gyimah-Boadi, supra note 50, at 35.
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By far the most profound change in the political and
constitutional context of presidential rule in contemporary Africa is
the growing popularity of presidential term limits. In sharp contrast
to the period before 1990 when Africa's presidents had the luxury of
determining their own longevity or tenure in office or simply risked
forcible removal through a coup d'6tat, today, in a growing number of
African states, constitutionally enshrined term limits impose a
definite end to presidential tenure. By the end of 2005, presidential
term limit provisions were contained in thirty-three African
constitutions. 3  In the overwhelming majority of these, elected
presidents must serve no more than two terms in office." Term limits
have already ended the presidential tenure of fourteen incumbent
presidents in Africa since 1990."5 In Malawi, Nigeria, and Zambia,
attempts by term-limited presidents to obtain constitutional
amendments to remove or extend their terms were defeated and the
presidents subsequently retired as constitutionally scheduled. The
combination of term limits and regular elections has displaced the
coup d'6tat as the primary mode of regime change and leadership
succession in contemporary Africa.56
The prospect of presidential term limits or electoral defeat is
constraining presidential incumbency in yet another important
respect. The possible loss of legal immunity that typically
accompanies retirement from presidential office opens up the
prospect of holding Africa's retired presidents to account legally for
abuses of power during their terms in office. Already, this has
happened in Zambia, where former President Chiluba is facing
prosecution on corruption charges relating to his term as president.57
In Ghana, too, several close associates of former president Jerry
53. See Posner & Young, supra note 31, at 132 (Figure 3).
54. Id.
55. These are Mathieu Kr6ko of Benin, Antonio Monteiro of Cape Verde, Jerry
Rawlings of Ghana, Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, Alpha Konare of Mali, Joaquim Chissano
of Mozambique, Miguel Trovoada of Sao Tome and Principe, France-Albert Rene of
Seychelles, Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania, Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, Bakili Muluzi of
Malawi, Sam Nujoma of Namibia, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, and Ahmad Tejan
Kabbah of Sierra Leone.
56. Posner & Young, supra note 31, at 129. See also Nicolas van de Walle, Africa's
Range of Regimes, 13 J. DEMOCRACY 66, 78 (2002) (describing presidential term limits as
"a new political norm in the region.").
57. See Neo Simutanyi, The contested role of former presidents in Zambia, in
LEGACIES OF POWER: LEADERSHIP CHANGE AND FORMER PRESIDENTS IN AFRICAN
POLITICS 88 (Roger Southall & Henning Melber eds., 2006).
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Rawlings, including the former first lady, are facing trial,58 and a few
have already been convicted 9 on charges stemming from various
financial dealings and transactions they allegedly were involved in
during Rawlings' tenure as president. Former Malawian president
Bakili Muluzi and some of his close associates have also been the
target of official investigation for alleged corruption during his
presidency.6°
In short, constitutional rules are beginning to matter in
contemporary Africa in ways they did not during the first three
decades after the end of the colonial era. Notably, even in those
instances where presidents have managed to stay on past their
original term limits, the term extensions were sought and obtained
through hard-fought constitutional battles, rather than through
unconstitutional means.61 Current trends clearly indicate that "[tihe
notion of a de jure or de facto president-for-life is no longer a tenable
proposition in Africa." 62 Even the African Union (AU), postcolonial
Africa's solidaristic interstate body notorious in the past (when it was
called the Organization of African Unity) for being a club of
dictators, has officially disavowed coups and, instead, adopted a
policy renouncing "unconstitutional changes of governments." 63
Despite these precedent-setting changes to the African political
and constitutional landscape, one important feature of the ancien
r~gime survives. This is the tradition of presidential supremacy.
Africa's presidents may have been term-limited, but the evidence
suggests that they have not quite been tamed yet. Presidential rule in
post-authoritarian Africa has no doubt become less fragrantly abusive
and arbitrary,' and the climate for personal liberty and rival political
58. More of Rawlings' Men for Trial, THE GHANAIAN OBSERVER, Feb. 21, 2007,
available at http://www.myjoyonline.com/archives/news/200702/1820.asp.
59. See H. Kwasi Prempeh & Stephen Kwaku Asare, The Public Officer as a
Fiduciary and the Law on Causing Financial Loss to the Ghanaian State, 16 CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES 1-2 (2003) (summarizing convictions of Rawlings administration officials
under section 179A(3) of the Ghana criminal code and discussing the judgment in one
leading case).
60. Malawi ex-leader on graft charges, BBC NEWS, July 27, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/africa/5220068.stm.
61. Posner & Young, supra note 31, at 134.
62. Prempeh, supra note 52, at 488.
63. AFRICAN UNION, CONST. ACT art. 4(p).
64. See Aili Mari Tripp, The Changing Face of Authoritarianism in Africa: The Case
of Uganda, 50/3 AFRICA TODAY 2 ("The old style personal dictatorships that ruled Africa
with impunity are virtually nonexistent today. [African] authoritarianism has 'softened.').
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activity has improved appreciably in Africa's democratizing states.6
Still, power in the African state continues to reside disproportionately
in the hands of one person-the president.'
The restoration and re-empowerment of parliaments and courts
in Africa have not altered the presidentialist orientation of African
governments or diminished presidential supremacy within the
political sphere. In Kenya, for example, members of parliament must
still swear allegiance not only to the constitution, but also to the
person of the President. As before, nothing good that needs done,
and nothing bad that needs undone, in the African state seems likely
to proceed without the personal initiative or intervention of the
president. The pace and direction of progress or reform, on nearly
every important issue, appears to depend on the level of a president's
personal interest and commitment. Presidents in contemporary
Africa still pronounce "laws" and announce major policy decisions
without recourse to parliament. The presidential directive-
"government by press release"-remains a common mode of
governing, and presidents continue to exert discretionary control over
public funds.67  As one Nigerian commentator has observed,
describing the state of constitutional politics in post-military Nigeria,
the contemporary president still "wears a dictatorial toga." 68 Similar
complaints about persistent presidential supremacy can be heard
65. Prempeh, supra note 52, at 22-23.
66. MCHUGH, supra note 20, at 140 (2002) ("[T]he dominant role of the Nigerian
president remains pervasive, even during periods of effective democratic sovereignty and
civilian control of the government."); Siri Gloppen, The Accountability Function of the
Courts in Tanzania and Zambia, in DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE JUDICIARY 119 (Siri
Gloppen, Robert Gargarella & Elin Skaar eds., 2004) ("multiparty elections and
constitutional changes have failed to diminish the dominance of the executive president");
Eboe Hutchful, Reconstructing Political Space: Militarism and Constitutionalism in Africa,
in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY
WORLD 225 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993); Jotham C. Momba, Evolution of
Parliament-Executive Relations in Zambia, in AFRICAN PARLIAMENTS: BETWEEN
GOVERNANCE AND GOVERNMENT 114 (M.A. Mohammed Salih ed., 2005) ("The
extensive powers that the president has been enjoying since 1964 have remained
essentially unchanged despite the general sentiments against such powers that came out
during the three previous constitutional review commissions."); Nicolas van de Walle,
Presidentialism and clientelism in Africa's emerging party systems, 41 J. MOD. AFR. STUD.
297, 310 (2003) ("Regardless of their constitutional arrangements, it is also a fact that
power is intensely personalized around the figure of the president.").
67. See, e.g., ERDMANN & SIMUTANYI, supra note 2, at 17.
68. Ochereome Nnanna, Is presidentialism a given?, VANGUARD, Feb. 28,2005, available
at http://www.vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/columns/peopleandpolitics/pp28022005.htmi.
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across post-transition Africa,69 and there are growing calls for another
round of constitutional revision to reduce presidential power. In
November 2005, Kenyan voters rejected a draft constitution said to
vest excessive power in the presidency. °
The persistence of the hegemonic presidency in post-
authoritarian Africa is puzzling-and not only because of all the
democratic and constitutional changes that have taken place in
several African states since 1990. What makes it even more puzzling
is the fact that Africa's postcolonial experience with this mode of rule
has been an unmitigated disaster. Over the course of three decades,
personal presidential rule in Africa became, in effect, "a substitute for
institutionalization" 7'-a substitute for building, that is, the capacities,
competencies and legitimacy of state institutions, especially in the
areas of policy formulation and implementation. As practically every
public decision of some import became a matter for the president's
"in box," other state institutions, notably parliament, the civil service,
and local government, were marginalized and atrophied over time.
Even the president's own ministers who headed cabinet departments
were relegated to "an executant's role, 72 routinely referring for the
president's pre-clearance matters formally committed to ministerial
decision.
"[T]he 'Office of the president' became a parallel government,
with considerably more executive power than the actual ministries.
' 73
One commentator, writing about Nkrumah's Ghana, called the office
of the president "the fourth branch" 74 of government-as indeed it
was. In Kenya, the office of the president alone reportedly had on its
payroll at one time over 43,000 staffers, representing one out of every
69. See, e.g., Daily Graphic, The president is too powerful-Ala Adjetey, Aug. 31,
2007, available at http://www.myjoyonline.com/politics/200708/8186.asp (Ghana). See also
Stephen N. Ndegwa and Ryan E. Letourneau, Constitutional Reform, in DEMOCRATIC
TRANSITIONS IN EAST AFRICA 84-100 (Paul J. Kaiser & F. Wafula Okumu eds., 2004)
(describing and criticizing persistent presidential dominance in the countries of the East
Africa region); David Booth et al., Drivers of Change and Development in Malawi,
Working Paper 261 (Overseas Dev't Inst., 2006) (describing persistent 'presidentialism' in
post-Banda Malawi).
70. BBC NEWS, Kenyans reject new constitution, Nov. 22, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/africa/4455538.stm.
71. NAOMI CHAZAN ET AL., POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA
163 (2d ed. 1992).
72. van de Walle, supra note 66, at 310.
73. Id.
74. HENRY BRETrON, THE RISE AND FALL OF KWAME NKRUMAH: A STUDY IN
PERSONAL RULE IN AFRICA 97 (1966).
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six civil servants in the country.75 As no country can be run effectively
from the president's office, in time presidential imperialism in Africa
resulted in the peculiar paradox of nominally "strong presidents"
presiding over "weak states"76_States that routinely lacked the
requisite institutional capacities and resources to fulfill their basic
social mission.
Presidential supremacy in Africa also famously brought with it a
peculiar form of rule-to which the term neopatrimonialism, of
Weberian origin,77 was applied' 8-in which presidential discretion and
access to the president became more important than formal rules.
The distribution of resources and patronage followed such access,
fueling corruption, nepotism, and waste. With the president
practically, and oftentimes legally, above the law, executive fiat and
arbitrariness became a regular modality of rule in Africa, with
damaging consequences for the rule of law.
The heavy cost and abuses associated with presidential
imperialism, not to mention gross abuses of human rights, supplied
one of the main grievances of the protest movement that propelled
recent reforms in Africa. Consequently, "the weakening of the
executive branch of government was an objective of the
prodemocracy forces in every new constitution promulgated in the
1990S.,,
79
Why, then, has presidential dominance survived in contemporary
Africa? To answer the question why imperial presidency persists in
Africa, it would help, first, to understand why and how it came to exist
as a defining feature of postcolonial African government in the first
place. But in order to justify further examination of this
phenomenon, it is important, first, to confront the common tendency
75. van de Walle, supra note 66, at 310 (citing the World Bank as source). The
presidency in Congo/Zaire also reportedly controlled between fifteen percent and twenty
percent of the national recurrent budget and thirty percent of capital expenditures. Id.
76. See Claude Ake, Rethinking African Democracy, in THE GLOBAL RESURGENCE
OF DEMOCRACY 69 (Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner eds., 2d. 1996) ("The coercive
monolithism of most African political systems readily gives the impression of states with
immense penetrative capacity, states which afe everywhere doing everything. Yet African
states are very weak. In Nigeria, for instance, the state has little influence on the lives of
the rural people. Much of the development that has taken place in rural communities has
occurred not because of the state but in spite of it.").
77. See generally MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (1968).
78. See generally BRATrON & VAN DE WALLE, supra note 46, at 61-96 (describing
neopatrimonial rule in Africa).
79. Id. at 246.
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to avoid critical analysis of Africa's imperial presidency by treating it
as simply "African culture" at work.
II. The African "Culture" Excuse; The Trouble with African
Exceptionalism
The study and analysis of social and political phenomena in
Africa has long been dominated by theories of African
exceptionalism." Following this perspective, "African tradition and
culture" has become a favorite autoexplanation-and, in many
instances, the monoexplanation-for all manner of socio-political
dysfunction in postcolonial Africa.8' The "African culture" thesis was
in fact pressed into service by some of Africa's postcolonial elites to
justify or explain various aspects of their authoritarian ideological and
constitutional choices in the immediate period after colonialism.
Notably, Tanzania's founding President, Julius Nyerere, among
others, strongly defended socialism as deeply rooted in the
communalistic and egalitarian ethos of traditional Africa.1 The move
toward a one-party state in postcolonial Africa was similarly
defended by its practitioners as reflecting the "consensus" tradition in
indigenous political systems." Equally, leading architects of imperial
presidency in postcolonial Africa sought cultural legitimacy for their
power grab by presenting the postcolonial African president as simply
a modern reincarnation of the traditional African "chief." On this
view, the African presidential monarch is merely the indigenous
African chief writ large.
80. C.f ALEX THOMSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO AFRICAN POLITICS 61 (2004)
(criticizing "tribalistic" interpretations of African politics as "worthless.").
81. It is commonplace, for example, for analysts of political corruption in Africa to
lay blame for the scale and persistence of the problem on a so-called African tradition of
"gift-giving" and reciprocity. See, e.g., Robert T. Tignor, Colonial Chiefs in Chiefless
Societies, 9 J. MOD. AFR. STUDS. 335, 351 (1971) (tracing the root of political corruption in
Africa to "traditional gift-giving, a form of reciprocity between the powerful and the
supplicants.").
82. JULIUS NYERERE, UJAMAA, ESSAYS ON SOCIALISM 12 (1968) ("We in Africa
have no more need of being 'converted' to socialism than we have being 'taught'
democracy. Both are rooted in our past-in the traditional society that produced us.").
See also TOM MBOYA, THE CHALLENGE OF NATIONHOOD 83-84 (1970) (defending
"African socialism" by contrasting African traditions and conceptions of ownership and
property rights with Europe's).
83. See, e.g., JULIUS NYERERE, FREEDOM AND UNITY 196-97 (1966). See also
Convention People's Party (CPP), Program for Work and Happiness, Appendix B, in
DAVID E. APTER, GHANA IN TRANSITION 394, para. 11 (1963) ("a multi-party system is
alien to the traditional conception of government in African Society.").
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Indeed, in the early years after independence Africa's imperial
presidents tried mightily to establish autochthony for their rule by
adopting the style of traditional kingship. President Nkrumah of
Ghana presents the classic case of this systematic effort to establish an
organic connection between traditional African kingship and the
postcolonial presidency. '  Nkrumah adopted customary protocol,
titles and symbols of traditional Ghanaian kingship as an integral part
of his presidential repertoire. Notably, he appropriated as his official
title the traditional Akan royal honorific, Osagyefo, roughly
translated as "warrior-savior" or "victorious in war." Customary
protocol reserved for traditional kingship ceremonies and occasions,
notably the offering of ritual sacrifice and libation, were performed
for Nkrumah on his visits across the country, at political rallies, and
upon his arrival back in Ghana from foreign travels." Nkrumah's
formal opening of the annual session of Parliament was similarly
attended by royal pomp and ceremony." His arrival was heralded by
the beating of the royal fontomforom drum, and he was met at the
forecourt of Parliament by a retinue of akyeame (or linguists)
representing different ethno-linguistic groups in GhanaY Libation
and special customary prayers were offered for Nkrumah before his
formal entry into the chamber of Parliament, and his entry was
announced by the sound of mmenson (the traditional "seven horns"
of Akan royalty).' For this and other formal ceremonies, Nkrumah
usually wore the traditional kente cloth of Akan kingship.89 All of
these performances were part of an elaborate "cult of personality"
built around Nkrumah, and were designed, in part, to secure cultural
84. Immediately upon assuming office as prime minister of an independent Ghana,
Nkrumah and his CPP launched "Operation Psychology," which involved the deployment
of "visual aids" and other propaganda designed to build Nkrumah into the symbol of a
new Ghanaian nationhood. The pages of the party newspaper, the Evening News, were
especially dedicated to this enterprise. See Barbara S. Monfils, A Multifaceted Image:
Kwame Nkrumah's Extrinsic Rhetorical Strategies, 7 J. BLACK STUD. 313 (1977).
85. See id. at 315-17.
86. See LESLIE RUBIN & PAULI MURRAY, THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT
OF GHANA 66, n. 49 (2d ed. 1964) (details of official government program forma
ceremonial opening of Parliament by President Nkrumah).
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. See Monfils, supra note 84, at 314-15. For populist events like political rallies,
Nkrumah usually wore the batakali, the smock commonly worn by men in the
economically poorer northern regions of Ghana, which the CPP had adopted as its official
dress.
90. See BRETTON, supra note 74, at 87-89.
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legitimacy or autochthony for Nkrumah's authoritarian projects.
Thus, the appearance of cultural authenticity that surrounded the rule
of postcolonial African leaders like Nkrumah did not come naturally
or freely; it was politically engineered and cost a fair amount in
investment of state resources.
In substance, however, Africa's imperial presidency fails to find
uniform or firm support in the traditions and practices of African
kingship. In articulating a cultural case for presidential supremacy,
Africa's leading proponents offered little specific cultural evidence
beyond the simple assertion that "the conception of a Head of State
who had virtually no power, and a Prime Minister who did have
power, was alien to our traditions."9 This, of course, is a critique of
the Westminster-style bifurcated executive, which was the form of
executive government reflected in the independence constitutions of
most African states. Specifically, the cultural claim here is simply that
the idea of a "titular" head of state is foreign to indigenous African
conceptions of political authority and, conversely, that the unitary or
"executive" presidency-the merger of all of the executive power of
the state in a single office-best accords with African traditional
government.
Indeed, the idea of an executive presidency has parallels in the
traditional kingship rule of several of Africa's indigenous political
systems, but a unitary presidency, by itself, falls short of describing an
imperial presidency. The essence of presidential imperialism is not
merely a president who holds or exercises all of the executive power
of the state. Imperial presidency implies a ruler with powers and
prerogatives that are not subject to meaningful or credible
institutional checks or restraint within the constitutional system. 92
Certain monarchies in traditional Africa were despotic or
"imperial" in the sense just described. Among the Buganda, for
example, "the pure authority of the Kabaka was not mitigated by any
other countervailing principle." 93  However, to say that this was
uniformly true or representative of traditional African kingship would
91. JULIUS NYERERE, FREEDOM AND DEVELOPMENT[UHURU NA MAENDELEO 271
(1973); see also KWAME NKRUMAH, AFRICA MUST UNITE 82 (1964) ("In our present
environment and circumstances our people associate primacy with power. The position of
a titular President ... would not have been easy for them to grasp.").
92. See Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 12, at 74 (describing the primary indicum of
"imperium" as "the execlusive constitutional right to direct the affairs of state.").
93. See David Apter, The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of
Ghana and Uganda, 13 WORLD POLITICS 45, 52 (1960).
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be to indulge a falsehood. In fact, the notion that the African
presidential monarch is simply the traditional African chief in modern
secular garb is based on a stereotype that has long been refuted
authoritatively by anthropologists and other social scientists who have
studied traditional African kingship and constitutional systems.9 Two
examples should suffice.
Take, for example, the Yoruba, one of largest and most
important groups in Africa's most populous state, Nigeria. In
precolonial times the Yoruba were organized into many separate
states.9 Each Yoruba state was a sovereign entity with its own oba or
king at its head. 96 Yoruba kingmakers approached the selection of an
oba with an eye toward forestalling or minimizing autocratic rule.
"[A] guiding principle was to select a ruler who would respect and
conform to the constitutional conventions of the kingdom." 9  The
kingmakers thus avoided selecting as oba a person who exhibited an
autocratic inclination or even one who merely possessed physical
characteristics that were believed to suggest such a tendency.98 In one
recorded instance, "a prince was rejected because he was so tall that
he would have looked down on his subjects. '
The oba was considered a sacred or divine king and accorded
appropriate reverence and authority by his people. However,
[t]his sacred aspect of Yoruba kingship did not lead to the oba's
becoming an autocrat but rather the reverse. Not only was he
bound by rules and precedents in his personal life but these also
required him to submit all business to councils of chiefs and
officers, and only after consultation and deliberation by these
bodies could a policy be decided and proclaimed in the oba's
100name.
94. See, e.g., K.A. BUSIA, THE POSITION OF THE CHIEF IN THE MODERN POLITICAL
SYSTEM OF ASHANTI (1951); AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS (M. Fortes and E.E. Evans-
Pritchard eds., 1940); R.S. RATrRAY, ASHANTI LAW AND CONSTITUTION (1911); Peter
Lloyd, The Political Structure of African Kingdoms, in POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND THE
DISTRIBUTION OF POWER (Michael Banton ed., 1965); R.S. RATrRAY, ASHANTI LAW
AND CONSTITUTION (1911).
95. See generally ROBERT S. SMITH, KINGDOMS OF THE YORUBA (3d ed., 1988).
96. Id. at 87-90.
97. Id. at 92.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 91.
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The composition of the oba's council infused Yoruba monarchy
with an important element of participatory legitimacy. The chiefs
who sat on the council, and thus with whom the oba was required to
consult in the exercise his legislative and judicial functions, were
themselves hereditary representatives of each of the various lineage
groups or "extended families which made up the population of the
town."''
The Yoruba political system ensured a "delicate balance of
power,"'" one in which, to paraphrase Madison, "ambition" was
checked by "ambition."'0 3 For example, in the kingdom of Oyo, the
most centralized and most powerful of the Yoruba kingdoms, the
king's council, or oyo mesi, was headed by the bashorun. As chief
military commander, chief kingmaker and the king's "first
minister, ' '1°4 the bashorun exerted an exceptional amount of influence
within the governmental system and was occasionally known to have
been more powerful than the oba himself. Furthermore, the
important war-making power in Oyo kingdom was constitutionally
divided between the oba and the war chiefs: Command and control of
the military was in the hands of the war chiefs, but only the oba could
authorize a military campaign) ° In modern constitutional parlance,
executive power in Oyo would be said to be bifurcated between the
oba, as president and head of state, and the bashorun, as prime
minister. This feature of Oyo constitutional order refutes a claim,
popularized by African presidents like Nkrumah and Nyerere, that a
bifurcation or sharing of executive power is alien to Africa's
indigenous political traditions.' °
The Akans of Ghana, one branch of which (the Nzimas)
Nkrumah belonged to by matrilineage, also shared a system of rule
much like the Yoruba's. First, despite occupying a sacral role within
101. Id. at 92.
102. Id. See also BASIL DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN: AFRICA AND THE
CURSE OF THE NATION-STATE 314 (1992).
103. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
104. SMITH supra note 95, at 92, 99.
105. Id. at 93.
106. Id. at 92.
107. See Victor T. Le Vine, African Patrimonial Regimes in Comparative Perspective,
18 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 657, 657-58 (1980) ("In traditional Africa, social and political
authority, which often focused and particularized, is seldom exercised exclusively by a
single person, tending to be vested in such collectives as lineages and/or age-grade
societies, or shared with such collateral roles or offices as queen-mothers, senior aunts or
uncles, kingmakers, priests, councils of title-holders, masters of ritual, and the like.").
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the traditional political system, indigenous Akan monarchs were not
"above the law," as postcolonial Africa's presidential monarchs were.
In Ashanti, an Akan kingdom famed for, among other things, its
federal military organization and imperial exploits,"°8 the Golden
Stool,"9 not the king himself (called the asantehene), symbolized "the
highest level of political authority in the land."11 In Kelsenian terms,
the Golden Stool was the grudnorm in Ashanti;" its symbolic
counterpart in the American political system would be the U.S.
Constitution. All allegiance in the kingdom, though nominally
rendered to the asantehene as occupant of the Golden Stool, was
actually owed and sworn to the Golden Stool."2 Thus the asantehene
himself was liable to be deposed for infidelity to the Golden Stool, as
happened to four asantehenes in the precolonial history of the
kingdom."3
Nominally an Akan king combined in his one office multiple
roles; he was at once "a judge, a commander-in-chief, a legislator, and
the executive and administrative head of his community.''114 But this
"was not many offices."''. Instead, it was a "single composite
office,""..6 whose diverse components were lodged in different
independent constitutional offices and entrusted to different
functionaries. As with the Yoruba, the holders of certain of these
offices constituted the king's council."7 An Akan king "was bound,
108. See Apter, supra note 93, at 52 ("[T]he core political unit [in Asante] was the
village. The largest unit was the division [or oman], over which there was a paramount
chief [or omanhene]. Kumasi, which established a compact with the other divisions in a
historical episode veiled in mystery and magic, became the center of a Confederacy. An
elaborate balance of checks and controls on authority extended from the village level to
the division, including restrictions on the exercise of power by the Asantehene, or king of
the Ashanti Confederacy."). See also K.A. BUSIA, AFRICA IN SEARCH OF DEMOCRACY
at 24 (1967) (describing the "delicate balance between central authority and regional
autonomy" on which the Asante political structure was predicated).
109. See DAVIDSON, supra note 102 (recounting briefly the story of Asante's Golden
Stool, the mythical embodiment of Asante nationhood and sovereignty). See also IVOR
WtLKS, ONE NATION, MANY HISTORIES: GHANA PAST AND PRESENT 28-32 (1996).
110. WILKS, supra note 109, at 30.
111. Austrian philosopher Hans Kelsen used the concept of grudnorm to denote the
fundamental norm upon which a legal system is based. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL
THEORY OF NORMS 252-64 (Michael Hartney trans., 1991) (1979).
112. WILKS, supra note 109, at 29.
113. Id.
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by custom, to act only with the concurrence and on the advice of his
Council. 118
In effect, while the Akan king might be said to reign alone, he
was constitutionally enjoined to rule only with the advice and consent
of his council. Willful disregard of this injunction, which was publicly
recited to the king on the occasion of his "enstoolment" (coronation),
constituted one of the principal grounds for "destoolment"
(equivalent to impeachment and removal)."9 Thus, while postcolonial
Africa's imperial presidents accorded to themselves indefinite or
lifetime tenure without the possibility of constitutional removal,
chiefs and kings in traditional Africa typically held office "during
good behavior"; it was not for them to determine the terms or
duration of their rule.
R.S. Rattray, a leading authority on the constitutional system of
Ashanti, concludes, in the light of the customary limitations on the
actions of the Akan chief, that "the West African chief "succeeded to
obligations rather than to rights."'1 20 Expanding on this theme,
Ghanaian legal scholar S. K. B. Asante has described the Akan chief
as a ruler subject to "the customary equivalent of a fiduciary's duty of
fidelity,"'12' a sacred duty enforced both by secular law and by
"ultimate accountability to ancestral spirits. ' 12
In contrast to postcolonial Africa's imperial presidents, who
routinely outlawed criticism of their rule and jailed their opponents
without trial, African chiefs were not free from criticism or censure by
their subjects. African chiefly councils were forums for open
deliberation, where "all different points of view ,1 23 were granted a
hearing. Outside the halls of the chief's court, criticism of the chief
was subject to customary "time, place, and manner" restrictions; but
the principle-that the people could criticize their ruler-was not
denied. Thus, among the Akan, for example, "there were traditional
ceremonies at which the people, particularly the women, could
lampoon in song and dance against their rulers with impunity."' 24
118. Id.
119. See RATTRAY, supra note 94, at 81-82.
120. R.S. Rattray, Present Tendencies of African Colonial Government, 33 J. ROYAL
AFR. SOC'Y. 23, 30 (1934).
121. S.K.B. ASANTE, PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL GOALS IN GHANA, 1844-1966 24
(1975).
122. Id.
123. BUSIA, supra note 108, at 28.
124. Id. at 142-43.
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Autocrats and tendencies toward tyrannical rule were, of course,
not unknown to traditional African society. Naturally, certain rulers
were corrupted by power."' But where such departures from
constitutional and customary precepts occurred, they were
understood as such-as "a violation of the system.""' And, in due
course, popular disapproval and attempts to restore the constitutional
order followed, the aim being "only to change the personnel of office
and never to abolish it or substitute for it a new form of
government."'
Africa's indigenous political systems and traditions could not be
called liberal or egalitarian by any contemporary measure; and no
such claim is suggested here. The limited object of this discussion is
to refute the claim that the monarchical tradition in indigenous Africa
uniformly sanctioned or tolerated absolute power in the fashion of
Africa's modern imperial presidents. While Africa's traditional
monarchies differed in their systems of rule, enough influential
examples exist of African monarchical rule constrained by
constitutional rules and by checks and balances. Moreover, merely
because a modern republic might have had a monarchy in its past,
including even its immediate past, does not condemn it to a regime of
presidential absolutism. Attempts by Africa's postcolonial rulers to
defend or justify presidential imperialism in the name of "African
tradition" are therefore insupportable. Ironically, while they were
quick to invoke African culture as their defense for their various
authoritarian projects, Africa's nationalist elites were, in fact, quite
contemptuous of African traditional institutions.'" For Africa's
125. Idat 26.
126. Id.; see also Fortes & Evans-Pritchard, supra note 94, at 13.
127. Fortes & Evans Pritchard, supra note 94, at 13.
128. See RICHARD RATHBONE, NKRUMAH AND THE CHIEFS 7 (2000) ("African
nationalists, like nationalists everywhere, used the clustered histories of their putative
nations romantically and instrumentally. They did so partly to establish their own
legitimacy .... But nowhere in Africa, however, were nationalists in business to
rehabilitate the dynasties, institutions, offices and practices of the precolonial past ....
Their mission was to destroy what they regarded as antique, feudalistic and
unprogressive."). See also Ali Mazrui, The American Constitution and the Liberal Option
in Africa: Myth and Reality, in THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AFRICA 23 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 1990) ("The actual deal we made in Africa with
the 20th century did not take into account enough of the preceding heritage that we had
accumulated. Initially there was almost cultural self-contempt so that inadequate
allowances were made for the usages of the indigenous population or for what had been
sanctioned by time.").
PRESIDENTLI POWERSummer 20081
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
imperial presidents, "[t]raditional social institutions and practices had
value only in political ritual."'29
III. The Making of the Imperial Presidency in Postcolonial
Africa
The search for the African agency behind the implantation of the
tradition of imperial presidency in postcolonial Africa must begin
with Africa's first generation of postcolonial leaders. Heroes of the
popular independence movements who emerged victorious in the
national struggles to end colonialism, postcolonial Africa's historic
"founding fathers"-Osagyefo Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana; Mwalimu
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania; Modibo Keita of Mali; le Grand Silly
S6kou Tourd of Guinea; Houphouet-Biogny of la C6te d'Ivoire; Mzee
Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya; Ngwazi Kamuzu Banda of Malawi;
Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia; etc.-were the architects of the imperial
presidency in postcolonial Africa."3
Popular legend as well as the dominant nationalist historiography
of the times-"the epic as political elites wanted it told"'3 -bestowed
upon these new leaders a messianic stature for their role in wrestling
sovereign statehood from the grips of imperial Europe. These were
the George Washingtons of Africa's new states; but the parallels end
there. For while America's popular Revolutionary War hero and first
president also enjoyed father-of-the-nation adulation and
reverence,'32 Washington did not yield to the temptation to initiate a
tradition of perpetual presidential reelection that could well have
made him his new nation's first elective monarch.'33 In contrast to
129. BRETTON, supra note 74, at 11.
130. See Victor T. Le Vine, The Rise and Fall of Constitutionalism in West Africa, 35 J.
MOD. AFR. STUD. 181, 203 (1997) ("It is the sad fact that it was the founding fathers in
[Africa] ... who must bear the blame for a great deal of what went wrong in their
countries.").
131. PAUL NUGENT, AFRICA SINCE INDEPENDENCE: A COMPARATIVE HISTORY 24
(2004).
132. See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, THE FIRST NEW NATION: THE UNITED STATES
IN HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1967) ("We tend to forget today that,
in his time, George Washington was idolized as much as many of the contemporary
leaders of new states.").
133. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 146 (2005)
("Washington set a striking example for his successors when in 1796 he declined to stand
for reelection at the end of his second term, even though he would have been a shoo-in.").
See generally Seymour Martin Lipset, George Washington and the Founding of
Democracy, 9 J. DEMOCRACY 24 (1998).
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Washington's self-abnegation, which is matched in Africa perhaps
only by Nelson Mandela's, 3 4 Africa's founding fathers were unwilling
to decouple their personal identities and life plans from the future of
their new nations. Regarded both by themselves and by their
followers as philosopher-kings,'3' they deemed their personal Platonic
Guardianship indispensable to the future progress and fortunes of
their newly emancipated states. "The story of postcolonial rulership
in Africa [is thus] at first largely a story of the historic nationalist
leaders."'36
A. Constructing Africa's "Model" Imperial Presidency
Presidential supremacy is rarely created by a "big bang" or
granted gratuitously by the framers of a constitutional republic. The
Framers of the U.S. Constitution did not create America's modern
imperial presidency; "[t]he assumption of that power by the
Presidency was gradual and usually under the demand or pretext of
an emergency."'' 7 Similarly, the rise of presidential omnipotence in
postcolonial Africa was not a spontaneous creature of constitutional
design; it too came into being under the "pretext of an emergency."
Constitutional design, when it was deployed, as indeed it was, served
primarily to ratify what was on the way to becoming political reality.
While they used constitutions instrumentally to serve their political
and other regime purposes, postcolonial Africa's first imperial
presidents rested their legitimacy on supra-constitutional sources.
Among Africa's founding generation, "the name of Kwame
Nkrumah should feature prominently in any analysis of how the
political dynamic in Africa after independence would evolve."'38 The
first black-African nationalist to become Prime Minister at the head
134. Nelson Mandela served as the first President of a post-apartheid South Africa
from April 1994 to June 1999. Despite his unparalleled popularity and iconic status, he
declined to stand for a second term. For an account of his post-retirement life, see John
Daniel, Soldiering on: the post-presidential years of Nelson Mandela 1999-2005, in
LEGACIES OF POWER, supra note 57, at 26.
135. See TOM MBOYA, THE CHALLENGE OF NATIONHOOD 9 (1970) (describing the
popular perception of the first leader of the independent African state as "the political
philosopher of the new nation"). See also Goran Hyden, The Failure of Africa's First
Intellectuals, 28 TRANSITION 14, 17 ("Plato's idea of the philosopher-king has hardly
anywhere been more deliberately put into practice than in Africa. As the philosopher
kings, the intellectuals in power have often been considered the 'national conscience."').
136. PATRICK CHABAL, POWER IN AFRICA: AN ESSAY IN INTERPRETATION 210
(1992).
137. SCHLESINGER, supra note 14, at ix.
138. HYDEN, supra note 48, at 26.
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of an all-African cabinet in colonial Africa, Nkrumah also blazed the
trail in sub-Saharan Africa when, in March 1957, he led the Gold
Coast to independence (as the new state of Ghana). On the occasion
of Ghana's independence he had announced that his new nation's
independence would be "meaningless unless it [was] linked with the
total liberation of Africa.' 39 His demonstrated commitment to that
project, reflected in his persistent advocacy of a federated Union of
African States,'140 made Nkrumah the most beloved pan-African
leader of his generation. To his admirers and praise singers, he was
not just Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana-he was "Kwame Nkrumah of
Africa,'' a style of address he used himself.42
But while Nkrumah's dream was supranational or continental in
scope, his immediate concerns and focus upon inheriting the colonial
state were more local: He first had to consolidate and secure his
"political kingdom' ' 143 at home. In the process, Ghana became the site
where postcolonial Africa's first imperial presidency would be
launched.
1. Building Nkrumah's Political Kingdom
Like the other African states that would come after it, Ghana
entered sovereign statehood under a Westminster-style constitution,
the form and substance of which reflected both the metropolitan (in
this case, British) constitutional practice and a delicate political
compromise brokered by the departing colonial authorities between
the "unitarist" Nkrumah and his "federalist" rivals in the nationalist
class.'" Formally speaking, Ghana's independence Constitution
established an English-style constitutional monarchy, with the Queen
of England, represented locally by a governor-general, as the titular
head of state. Effective governmental power, however, was vested in
a prime minister and a cabinet drawn from the majority party in a
139. THE EDITORS OF THE SPARK, SOME ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF NKRUMAISM 71-
72 (1965).
140. See NKRUMAH, supra note 91, at 216-22.
141. See BRETTON, supra note 74, at 36.
142. Id.
143. The term "political kingdom" comes from Nkrumah's famous statement made
during the anti-colonial period: "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all things shall be
added unto you." It became the slogan of Nkrumah's Convention People's Party. See
NKRUMAH, supra note 91, at 50.
144. See WILLIAM BURNETT HARVEY, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN GHANA 141
(1966).
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single-chamber legislature .1 4  The governor-general's formal assent
was required before any bill could become law, but in performing this
function, the governor-general was bound by the advice of the prime
minister's cabinet.
Although pre-independence demands by Nkrumah's opponents
for a federal form of government had failed to carry, the
independence constitution required, as a compromise, that
Parliament enact legislation to establish regional assemblies in the,
then, five territorial regions of as well as a House of Chiefs in each
region. 14' The constitution enumerated certain responsibilities, among
them education, public health, town and country planning, and local
police, that Parliament was required to place under the non-exclusive
legislative jurisdiction of the Regional Assemblies. The Regional
Assemblies and the Houses of Chiefs were also assigned an important
role in the constitutional amendment process.
The independence constitution also contained substantive
protections for freedom of conscience and religion, for private
property, as well as safeguards against racial or ethnic
discrimination. 14 The Supreme Court of Ghana was vested with
original jurisdiction in all cases challenging the validity of a law and
was also empowered to declare void any law that contravened the
substantive limitations on the legislative power of Parliament.48
Nkrumah's objections to Ghana's independence constitution,
which centered on the concessions made in favor of regionalism and
the insulation of civil service personnel from political control, were
well known before independence. 149 However, if he had rejected the
constitution beforehand it would have delayed until an unknown time
the grant of Ghana's independence. Thus, Nkrumah agreed to the
limitations contained in the constitution as a precondition for
independence and deferred his preferred constitutional design until
later. The construction of Africa's first imperial presidency, however,
did not begin with constitutional reform. In fact, the move toward
that end preceded the grant of independence; and it began within the
structures of Nkrumah's political party.
145. See RUBIN & MURRAY, supra note 86, at 8.
146. See HARVEY, supra note 144, at 141-42.
147. Id. at 221.
148. Id.
149. See THE SPARK, supra note 139, at 43-49.
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Roughly, the project of constructing the imperial presidency in
Africa's maiden state consisted of the following parts and steps: First,
the assumption of personal supremacy over the governing party;
second, centralization of the state; third, suppression-and later
elimination-of political opposition; and finally, subordination of the
legislature and judiciary to the presidency.
a. Personal Control of the Party
The first of these building blocs was laid during the late colonial
period, within the nationalist party that assumed leadership of the
anti-colonial struggle. Nkrumah founded the Convention People's
Party (CPP) in 1940, claiming it to be "my party." ''5 He was, from the
founding of the party, its life chairman and leader.'51 In that capacity,
he chaired both the national executive committee and the more
influential central committee of the party.152  Later after
independence, as the party consolidated its hold on national
government, Nkrumah added to his life chairmanship the positions of
general secretary of the party (after 1961) and executive secretary of
the party (from 1965). In 1962, at the party's annual national
delegates conference, Nkrumah gained the power to unilaterally
change the party's Constitution as well as membership of the central
committee. This was mere formality, for Nkrumah had always stood
above the Constitution and party structures.'53 Within the CPP,
legitimacy came solely from Nkrumah and from association with
him."5 The CPP loyalty oath, administered to all party members,
demanded allegiance to the party and its "Leader, Comrade Osagyefo
Dr. Kwame Nkrumah.' 15' The party's ideology was "Nkrumaism, '
the full content of which was to be "worked out by Nkrumah and
expounded in his writings." '57 As later expounded by Nkrumah, and
as reflected in the 1960 Constitution and subsequent amendments,
150. See NKRUMAH, supra note 23, at 103.
151. See Henry L. Bretton, Current Political Thought and Practice in Ghana, 52 AMER.
POL. Sci. REV. 46, 55-56 (1958); Dennis L. Cohen, The Convention People's Party of
Ghana: Representational or Solidarity Party?, 4 CAN. J. AFR. STUD. 173, 185-86 (1970);
Ryan, supra note 69, at 156.
152. Cohen, supra note 151, at 185.
153. APTER, supra note 83, at 207.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 353 n.31.
156. CPP, Work and Happiness, supra note 83, at 395, 1 16.
157. Id.
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Nkrumaism committed Ghana to a one-party state under the personal
rule of Nkrumah. Nkrumah's successful and unchallenged supremacy
over the CPP easily enabled his ultimate assumption and
consolidation of his supremacy over the government and state of
Ghana.
b. Centralizing the State
Immediately upon Ghana's attainment of sovereign statehood,
Nkrumah set out to dismantle the fetters he believed the
independence constitution had placed on his freedom of action.
Nkrumah condemned the constitutional scheme for a sharing of
certain powers and functions between the central government and
regional assemblies as "political separatism," "schisms" devised by
the departing colonial power to impede "speedy development" and
designed to ensure the "preservation of imperial interests in the
newly emergent state."'58 Abolishing the regional assemblies would
thus become Nkrumah's topmost political priority immediately after
independence.
In September 1958, acting pursuant to the constitution, the
Nkrumah controlled legislature passed a law establishing the regional
assemblies. The new law, however, transferred no legislative or
executive powers to the regional assemblies.159  The regional
assemblies were merely to offer advice to ministers and regional
administrators appointed by the central government."6 An opposition
party boycott of the ensuing regional assembly elections gave
Nkrumah's party total control of all five regional assemblies. 6'
Relying on his overwhelming majorities in both the regional
assemblies and the national legislature, Nkrumah secured passage of
a bill in December 1958 to repeal the amendment procedure in the
constitution that required the approval of a super-majority of regional
assemblies for certain proposed amendments.'62 With the repeal of
that portion of the constitution, any constitutional provision could
now be amended or repealed by a simple majority vote of Parliament.
In effect, the constitution had been reduced to an ordinary statute;
158. THE SPARK, supra note 139, at 39.
159. See HARVEY, supra note 144, at 147.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 148.
162. Id. at 149.
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parliamentary supremacy had replaced constitutional supremacy."'
In March 1959, the Nkrumah-controlled Parliament approved a
legislative amendment to the constitution abolishing the regional
assemblies." All legislative and executive power, including the
power to amend the Constitution, was now completely centralized.
c. Suppressing Political and Chiefly Opposition
By a series of legislation, Nkrumah also nationalized the
management of, and revenue receipts from, all lands under the
control of Ghana's influential chiefs,165 thus depriving the chiefly class
of the economic basis of their customary power. Further
subordination of the chiefs to national political control was secured
by legislation making the official "recognition" of the central
government a precondition for the exercise of customary authority by
a chief.'6 A Preventive Detention Act was enacted in 1958, pursuant
to which the executive (if it was satisfied that the national security so
demanded) could order the arrest and detention without trial of any
citizen for periods up to five years at a time.167 Detention under the
Act constituted grounds for disqualification from or forfeiture of
membership in Parliament. 16' The preventive detention law, as well as
other new revisions and additions to the criminal code targeting
political dissent,69 were vigorously enforced against leading or
suspected members of the opposition party, severely hampering
opposition activity and driving some of their leaders into exile.
d. Constitutionalizing Presidential Supremacy
The next step, once all putative rivals to the central authority had
been neutralized, was to concentrate the centralized governmental
power "horizontally" in the hands of a single person. To this end, a
new constitution was adopted in 1960 to replace the Westminster-
style independence constitution. Subordination of the legislature to
the executive-and, specifically, to Nkrumah as prime minister-was,
of course, already assured under the extant parliamentary
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 115-20.
166. See RATHBONE, supra note 128, at 130.
167. See HARVEY, supra note 144, at 283-84. The Act is reproduced as an appendix to
Harvey's book. See id. at 446-48.
168. Id. at 431.
169. Id. at 312-21.
constitutional system, as the Nkrumah-dominated CPP controlled a
solid majority in the national assembly. Still, the logic of the
parliamentary system of government meant that, "Despite the
widening of his executive powers as Prime Minister since 1957,
Nkrumah was still constitutionally primus inter pares amongst his
cabinet colleagues. He was still in theory at least subject to the
possibility of upset or removal in the event of a domestic [internal
party] crisis."17 Nkrumah's new constitution, enacted in 1960, "would
insure against that contingency."17'
The "Republican Constitution" of 1960172 abolished Ghana's
constitutional monarchy, thus eliminating the Queen of England as
titular head of state. Executive power, which had previously been
nominally bifurcated between a titular head of state and a prime-
minister-led cabinet, was now vested exclusively in a unitary
president. Ghana's conversion to a unitary presidency was itself
unexceptional, except that the new Ghana constitution also conferred
broad (often sui generis) powers on the President while
correspondingly reducing the powers of the legislative assembly.
For example, the President could use his veto to reject a bill in its
entirety or in part-a "line item" veto, in effect. A presidential veto
was not subject to a legislative override.173 The President also had
power to "prorogue" or terminate at any time a session of
parliament.' The legislature had power to approve or reject each
head of the executive's annual budget estimates, but it had no power
to amend them as proposed by the President.' The President could
authorize moneys to be drawn from public funds outside the
statutorily approved budget.'76 The President was empowered to
appoint from among members of Parliament any number of ministers
to constitute his government. 7 No legislative approval was required
for these appointments and the legislature had no power to censure
170. TREVOR JONES, GHANA'S FIRST REPUBLIC: THE PURSUIT OF THE POLITICAL
KINGDOM 27 (1976).
171. Id.
172. The full text of the 1960 Constitution is reproduced as Appendix I in HARVEY,
supra note 144, at 390.
173. GHANA CONST. art. 24(1) (1960).
174. Id. at art. 22(2).
175. Id. at art. 31(2).
176. Id. at arts. 32, 34.
177. Id. at art. 15.
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or remove a minister.178 The President was also vested with unilateral
appointment power over numerous other constitutional offices,
including notably, the appointment of the chief justice and other
judges of the superior courts,'79 the auditor general,'O the attorney
general,18 1 and members of the civil service." The chief justice, and
by subsequent amendment all judges of the supreme court or high
court, held their offices at the pleasure of the president," as did the
attorney general,' 84 whose position had been moved in 1959 from the
civil service category to that of a political appointee.'5
Ghana's 1960 constitution reserved certain sui generis powers for
the "First President."'" The constitution specifically named Nkrumah
as the First President,"8 having been deemed appointed to that office
by an earlier referendum that approved a draft of the constitution."
The tenure of the First President was co-terminus with Nkrumah's
(which was indefinite) as it "continue[d] until some other person
assume[d] office as President."'89 The President was subject to re-
election without limit-but only by Parliament. The constitution
made no provision for a vice or deputy president. By a later
amendment, the President was empowered to appoint a three-
member presidential commission to act in the event of his incapacity,
resignation, or absence.
As First President, Nkrumah had power under the 1960
constitution "whenever he consider[ed] it to be in the national
interest to do so, [to] give directions by legislative instruments."'' In
178. Id.
179. Id. at arts. 44(1), 45(1).
180. Id. at art. 38(1).
181. Id. at art. 47(1).
182. Id. at art. 51(2).
183. Id. at art. 45(3).
184. Id. at art. 47(3).
185. BRETrON, supra note 74, at 48.
186. See GHANA CONST. art. 55 (1960).
187. Id. at art. 10.
188. The draft of the constitution submitted to the national referendum did not include
the provision relating to the special powers of the First President, and the enacted
constitution included other significant post-referendum changes and additions made by
Nkrumah's government. See RUBIN & MURRAY, supra note 86, at 15-31.
189. GHANA CONST. art. 55(5) (1960).
190. Id. at art. 18(1).
191. Id. at art. 55(2).
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effect, Nkrumah could legislate alone or alter unilaterally a pre-
existing statute.
Ghana's constitution required the President, upon assuming
office, to make a solemn declaration of his "adherence" to certain
enumerated "fundamental principles," '92 among them, that "no
person should be deprived of freedom of religion or speech, of the
right to move and assemble without hindrance or of the right of
access to the courts of law" and "no person should suffer
discrimination on grounds of sex, race, tribe, religion or political
belief." Initial uncertainty as to the juridical character of this
declaration was resolved in Re Barfour Osei Akoto & 7 others,1 93 a
habeas corpus case brought by certain opposition party politicians
held in detention under the Preventive Detention Act. Denying relief
for the petitioners, the Ghana Supreme Court held that the
"fundamental principles" subscribed to by the President in the
declaration did not constitute a justiciable Bill of Rights.' In the
Court's opinion, the solemn declaration of the Ghanaian President
was "similar to the Coronation Oath of the Queen of England."' 9 As
such, this declaration imposed a "moral" (but not a legal) obligation
on the President that could be enforced in the courts. 96 In short, the
Republican Constitution of Ghana guaranteed the citizens of Ghana
no rights whatsoever.
A later amendment to the constitution, outlawing all opposition
parties and making the CPP the sole political party in Ghana, finally
affirmed in law the party's long-running boast that "[t]he CPP is
Ghana and Ghana is the CPP"-but it also fatally drove the
opposition into illegality. With Nkrumah already firmly in control of
the CPP, the conversion to a de jure one-party state crowned
Nkrumah as Ghana's "presidential monarch."' '
2. Exporting the "Nkrumah Model"
Since pioneering African independence in 1957, Ghana has
"served as a social laboratory for the continent as a whole."' 98 Not
only was Nkrumah's Ghana "in many respects the bellwether for the
192. Id. at art. 13.
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continent," ' 99 but more importantly, Nkrumah himself "came to set
the tone, ideologically and organizationally, for much of the rest of
Africa." 20° Besides being the first to lead his country to independence
in sub-Saharan Africa, Nkrumah's influence in this regard must have
stemmed from the fact that among his peers in independent Africa,
he had the first and exceptional experience of actually exercising
executive power-as Leader of Government Business and then as
Prime Minister-and running a national government for six
continuous years (1951-57) before Ghana became fully sovereign.
Thus, as independence followed Ghana's lead and spread to the
rest of Africa, the post-independence constitutional and legislative
moves implemented in Nkrumah's Ghana-notably the rejection of
arrangements for regional devolution of power and the
recentralization of government, the installation of a de jure one-party
state, and the subordination of party and state to the "personal rule"
of a unitary president-would inspire imitations from one African
state to the other. In the brief period from the end of 1960 to early
1962, thirteen African states enacted new constitutions or revised the
constitutions they had inherited at independence. 20' Others followed
suit as they gained sovereign status. Common to these constitutional
revisions was "a movement from traditional parliamentarianism to a
new form of presidentialism, ''202 characterized by "enhanced" or
"reinforced" presidential power.2 3  Importantly, these emerging
presidential regimes tended to follow the pattern set by Nkrumah.2°
Particularly in those African states that shared Ghana's common
British colonial experience and heritage (such as Kenya, Uganda,
Tanzania, Malawi, and Zambia) "almost every step in Ghana's post-
independence constitutional development [was] followed, in almost
its precise sequence."2 5
Thus, for example, the nationalist governments of independent
Kenya and Uganda both unilaterally discarded the regionalist or
federalist features in their independence constitutions;2°6 Tanzania
199. F.A.R. BENNOIN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF GHANA 87 (1962).
200. HYDEN, supra note 48, at 26.
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and Uganda moved quickly to abolish the customary law powers of
traditional chiefs, with Zambia following suit in short order;207 and, in
time, the idea of a president-dominated, one-party state achieved
such ubiquity across the continent that it came to be regarded as a
distinctive African constitutional form. Importantly, the nationalist
leaders in independent Africa all ensured their personal supremacy
over their respective governing parties, almost as a necessary first
step toward establishing presidential supremacy over the state.
B. Rational Explanations for the Rise of the Imperial Presidency in
Africa
If, as I have previously argued, the African culture thesis does
not explain the political pattern outlined in the foregoing narrative,
what "rational" explanation might account for the continent-wide
move toward presidential supremacy in postcolonial Africa? In fact,
there was no shortage of rational explanation or justification for the
installation of presidentialist regimes in Africa in the period following
the end of colonial rule. By far, the dominant explanation at the time
focused on the pressures and demands of national integration and
socio-economic development-the two main challenges that
confronted Africa's new states and their governments at
independence.
In the next section, we examine each of these "internal"
rationales for the implantation of authoritarian presidential regimes
in postcolonial Africa and then briefly discuss the "historical" and
"external" factors that may have conditioned postcolonial agency in
the direction of presidential autocracy.
1. The Internal Rationales
a. The "National Integration" Rationale
"National integration" was the rationale most commonly cited by
Africa's first postcolonial leaders to justify the move-during the
early post-independence years-to centralize presidential power. The
colonial project in Africa collected into arbitrarily drawn boundaries
separate and diverse ethno-linguistic groups and communities, many
of them with little or no pre-colonial history of mutual co-existence.
Colonial policy naturally did not encourage the rise of national
feeling among the colony's diverse subject populations. While the
207. Id. at 161-71.
Summer 20081
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
struggle to end colonialism managed to arouse an appreciable degree
of national consciousness particularly among the colony's sparse
urban populations, the rivalrous politics of late-colonial nationalism
also exposed the persistence and resilience of pre-colonial loyalties
and identities.
The factionalism that arose within Africa's nationalist class in the
late colonial period roughly paralleled the fault lines that had
separated America's eighteenth century Founding Fathers into
"federalists" (in favor of a strong national government) and "anti-
federalists" (defending local/regional autonomy). Invariably in
Africa, the triumphant nationalist party-the party that inherited the
colonial state-was the party of strong national government. It was
thus the vision and conception of the "nation-state" held by this
faction of the nationalist elite that would prevail in the postcolonial
period.
Africa's new states began sovereign life with a critical deficit of
legitimacy, as "the national and institutional bonds that linked people
together on the eve of independence were tenuous at best., 20 As
Senegalese President Senghor observed,
In Africa, the Fatherland is the Serer country, the Malinke
country, the Sonhrai, the Mossi, the Baule, the Fon country.
The Nation unites Fatherlands in order to transcend them. It is
not, like the Fatherland, a natural phenomenon .... In order to
achieve its object, the Nation must inspire all its members, all its
individuals to seek in it, beyond their Fatherlands, their faith.209
The challenge was to shift loyalties from traditional kin-based
conceptions of identity to the "new artificial entity, the nation-
state., 20 For this project of nation building, Africa's new states
needed unifying "symbols," and not just flags and national anthems
or soccer teams but an embodied symbol to which the people would
feel a high degree of common attachment and emotive draw. The
answer came in the form of the "heroic leader.",
21
Invariably this honor belonged (almost exclusively) to the
"father of the nation"-the founder and leader of the nationalist
208. CHAZAN ET AL., supra note 71, at 79.
209. IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, AFRICA AND THE POLITICS OF INDEPENDENCE 88-
89 (1961).
210. Id. at 99.
211. See APTER, supra note 83, at 368; WALLERSTEIN, supra note 209, at 99.
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movement through whose heroism and guidance independence had
been won; or such, as least, was how popular legend saw it. "The
momentum that brought them to power [was] still strong. Their
record or sacrifice [was] still fresh in the minds of the people who
continue[d] to have the same faith and confidence in them as they did
when they called them to unite against colonial rule." '212 Only they
commanded that "aura of legitimacy ' 212 that made them "a readily
available, easily understood, symbol of the new nation.
214
As Nkrumah's leading ideological mouthpiece, The Spark,
explained, referring to the Ghanaian context:
The charismatic personality of President Nkrumah is one of the
props on which the new nation of Ghana is built. It is not mere
personality worship. It is the most practical way of providing
the new ship of state with a stable keel. If a young nation
cannot anchor itself down to a few basic concepts and rules of
practice, there is an air of drifting which is most injurious to
national evolution. And these principles must be crystallized in
a person with whom, as a result of his personal efforts and
sacrifices, the broad masses associate the yearnings for a better
life.
215
Similar projects of "national synonymity 216--the idea that "the
country is the man and the man is the country",217-were implemented
in the rest of independent Africa. Thus, in short order, "Kenya was
Kenyatta. Kenyatta was Kenya; Houphouet-Biogny [stood] for Cote
d'Ivoire, Zambia [was] Kaunda, and Sekou Toure was, for better or
worse, Guinea. Tanzania was Nyerere and Nyerere stood for
Tanzania. Hastings Banda [was] Malawi and Malawi... symbolized
Banda., 21" The ideology of national integration was thus marshaled to
underwrite the project of personal rule.
212. MBOYA, supra note 82, at 9.
213. Martin L. Kilson, Authoritarian and Single-Party Tendencies in African Politics, 15
WORLD POLITICS 262, 266 (1963).
214. WALLERSTEIN, supra note 209, at 99. See also TOM MBOYA, FREEDOM AND
AFTER 83 (1963).
215. BRETTON, supra note 74, at 12.
216. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, His Eternity, His Eccentricity, or His Exemplarity: A
Further Contribution to the Study of H. E. the African Head of State, 90 AFR. AFF. 163, 167
(1991).
217. Id at 168.
218. Id.
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The national integration rationale was similarly deployed to
justify the two main structural underpinnings of presidential
supremacy in Africa: the centralized unitary state and the one-party
system. Africa's postcolonial leaders expressed grave misgivings
about demands for, or concessions made in certain independence
constitutions in favor of, regionalism or federalism. Such demands
were disparaged as tribalism-inspired and thus an invitation to
separatism.219  What was needed was "unity behind [the]
leadership., 220  Significantly, under the conception of unity and
nationhood pressed by Africa's postcolonial leaders-which was
more along the lines of the European "nation-state" model 22 -not
only did national interests and national identity (even if inchoate)
supersede all local or subnational identities, but only claims on the
behalf of the nation were deemed valid 2
The national integration rationale also proved hostile to multi-
party politics-for roughly the same reasons that it ruled out
federalist or regionalist ideas. Multi-party competition, its African
detractors argued, made sense only in the class-stratified societies of
the industrialized West.23  The argument continued that as
postcolonial Africa was still pre-industrial and thus presumably
classless, rival political parties served no constructive interest
aggregation or representational function in the African context. 4
Rather, since "tribe," not class, supposedly represented the only real
cleavage in postcolonial society, political party rivalry would work to
entrench social division by encouraging partisan mobilization and
politicization of ethnicity.2 25 In fact, in many instances, notably in
Nkrumah's Ghana, the national leadership seemed convinced that
that dire prospect was already at hand. 26 Thus, Africa's new leaders
moved quickly after independence to suppress opposition and install
one-party regimes-making sure, of course, to secure first their own
personal control over the ruling party-ostensibly to forestall the
219. CPP, Work and Happiness, supra note 83, at 394.
220. NYERERE, supra note 91, at 54.
221. See BUSIA, supra note 108, at 115 n.5 (1967) (describing the European nation-
state model preferred by Africa's postcolonial leaders).
222. Id. at 115-19.
223. See, e.g., MBOYA, FREEDOM AND AFTER, supra note 214, at 85.
224. Id.
225. See CPP, Work and Happiness, supra note 83, at 394.
226. NKRUMAH, supra note 91, at 68 (referring to the opposition in Ghana as
"violently destructive" and separatist).
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disintegrative tendencies allegedly inherent in multi-party
competition.
b. The "Development" Rationale
For Africa's postcolonial leaders, the national integration project
was only an instrumentality. The real goal was material in nature; it
was to transform the inherited colonial economy and uplift the social
and economic condition of the newly liberated African populations.227
"Development" became the rallying cry of the times, and it trumped
all else. As Nyerere stated, defending his introduction of a preventive
detention law, "Development must be considered first . . . . Our
question with regard to any matter-even the issue of fundamental
freedom-must be 'How does this affect the progress of the
Development Plan?"'2
The development challenge was enormous. Although Europe's
moral defense of its colonization of Africa had been suffused with
theories of trusteeship and benevolent paternalism, the driving force
behind the colonial project in Africa "was not primarily a concern for
the welfare of the peoples of Africa as for trade and the possession of
materials known or believed to exist in Africa. 229 Where the colonial
administration invested in "development" projects, such as railways,
harbors, roads, health services or schools, the territory or population
that was served was severely limited and the purpose primarily
instrumental; it was to enable or facilitate the extraction of minerals
and external trade and to help meet the limited local staffing needs of
colonial administration. Thus, African states entered independence
with massive deficits in all the critical areas of need: health care,
education, technology, communications, jobs, housing, and internal
markets. Even "[i]n Ghana, which boasted some of the finest
educational institutions in Africa, over 70% of the population was
227. See, e.g., NYERERE, supra note 91, at 54.
228. See, e.g., DENNIS AUSTIN, POLITICS IN AFRICA 69 (1984) (quoting statement by
President Nyerere of Tanzania that, "[d]evelopment must be considered first .... Our
question with regard to any matter-even the issue of fundamental freedom-must be
'How does this affect the progress of the Development Plan?"').
229. BUSIA, supra note 108, at 37-38. See also Ali Mazrui, Nkrumah: The Leninist-
Czar, 26 TRANSITION 8 (1966), reprinted in 75/76 TRANSITION 106, 112 ("The paramount
motivation behind the old imperial expansion was the economic exploitation of the
countries that were annexed. All arguments about spreading Christianity and Western
civilization-or ending the Arab slave trade-were merely camouflage for the imperial
profit motive.").
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illiterate on the eve of independence." ' At the other extreme,
Congo, when it gained independence from Belgium in 1960, had only
16 post-secondary school graduates, for a population of 13 million.
The pressure on postcolonial governments to deliver results was
equally enormous and urgent. Nkrumah's famous pre-independence
declaration, "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else shall be
added unto you," summed up the terms of the social contract that
Africa's nationalist leaders had made with their peoples-with
independence would come substantial social and material
improvement for all."' Development assumed the character of a
national emergency."' The challenge was frequently expressed in
terms of a "war" 233-a war to conquer "those very real enemies-
ignorance, poverty and disease., 2' The development rationale, and
its associated metaphors, carried obvious authoritarian implications.
Explaining why Tanzania's proposed new constitution had
institutionalized presidential dominance and dispensed with "checks
and balances," President Nyerere invoked the development rationale
with characteristic eloquence:
Our Constitution differs from the American system in that it
avoids any blurring of the lines of responsibility, and enables
the executive to function without being checked at every turn.
For we recognize that the system of 'checks and balances' is an
admirable way of applying the brakes to social change. Our
need is not for brakes-our lack of trained manpower and
capital resources, and even our climate, act too effectively
already. We need accelerators powerful enough to overcome
the inertia bred of poverty, and the resistances which are• • 231
inherent in all societies.
Ghana's Nkrumah similarly justified the extraordinary powers
granted him under the 1960 Constitution by invoking the
development rationale:
The increased authority given to the President is to enable him
to exercise the positive leadership that is so vital to a country
230. CHAZAN ET AL, supra note 71, at 28.
231. See MBOYA, supra note 82, at 15.
232. See, e.g., CPP, Work and Happiness, supra note 83, at 394, 11.
233. See, e.g., NKRUMAH, supra note 91, at 103; NYERERE, supra note 91, at 286.
234. MBOYA, supra note 214, at 159 (quoting Nyere).
235. Julius Nyerere, How much Power for a Leader?, 7 AFR. REP. 5 (1962).
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seeking to pull itself up by its bootstraps. If I may change the
metaphor, it is in some ways the work of Sisyphus, except that
instead of a stone our task is to roll a whole people uphill.
There are some jobs in the world that can be best done by a
committee, others need a managing director."'
There was little question who would be in the managing director's
seat.
Development underwrote presidential autocracy in another
important respect, namely in the model of development that Africa's
leaders selected. Almost invariably, the choice was in favor of
socialism-or, as its "Africanized" adaptation came to be known,
"African Socialism." The controlling arm of the state, not the
invisible hand of the market, would thus be responsible for the
allocation and management of resources and for the production and
distribution of a wide array of goods and services needed by Africa's
peoples. For East Africa's political leadership especially, the choice
of socialism was dictated by their view of African society (and
traditions) as classless and communal in nature and thus not
amenable to capitalist modes of production.2 37 Nkrumah, on the other
hand, felt drawn to socialism by default, as "colonial rule precluded
that accumulation of capital among our citizens which would have
assisted thorough-going private investment in industrial
construction." 8 Whatever the justification, the choice of a socialistic
model cast the African state in a central role not only economically,
but also politically; it called for "a strong, stable, firm and highly
centralized government" and for "power [to] be concentrated in the
country's leadership." 39  Socialism thus furnished an additional
justification for the one-party state and for authoritarian political
leadership.
236. NKRUMAH, supra note 91, at 83.
237. See, e.g., REPUBLIC OF KENYA, AFRICAN SOCIALISM AND ITS APPLICATION TO
PLANNING IN KENYA (Government Printer 1965) ("The sharp class divisions that once
existed in Europe have no... parallel in African society. No class problem arose in the
traditional African society and none exists today among Africans."). See also MBOYA,
supra note 214, at 166-68 ("[The] main difference [between African social and cultural
structure and the European structure] ... is that [the African] is communal by nature.
Most African tribes have a communal approach to life .... The practice of African
socialism involves trying to use what is relevant and good about these customs to ... build
an economy which reflects the thinking of the great majority of the people.").
238. NKRUMAH,supra note 91, at 119.
239. CPP, Work and Happiness, supra note 83, at 393-94.
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2. Historical and Comparative Rationales
a. The Colonial Experience and Its Legacy
By far the most influential historical antecedent for presidential
autocracy in postcolonial Africa came from its immediate
predecessor-the colonial state. "Although we commonly describe
the independent [African] polities as 'new states,' in reality they were
successors to the colonial regime, inheriting its structure, its quotidian
routines and practices, and its more hidden normative theories of
governance." 24 The African colonies had been ruled, all along, along
hierarchical autocratic lines. Only as independence appeared
inevitable and proximate did the colonial authorities seek a "dignified
retreat from empire 241 by introducing constitutional forms modeled
after the metropolitan constitutional systems. Consequently, the
parliamentary-style constitutions on the basis of which the African
colonial state was ushered into the community of sovereign nations
had no local parliamentary or liberal tradition to back them, as none
had been fostered under colonial rule. Thus Africa's postcolonial
leaders had little difficulty regressing to the former, more established
authoritarian path when confronted with the "dual" legacy of the
colonial regime, or what one commentator has called an
"authoritarian-democratic paradox," 242 --namely, a dominant
autocratic heritage embedded in the practices, usages, laws, and
institutions of the colonial state one the one hand, and on the other
hand a transitory "democratic" bequest (in the form of the
independence constitution) which lacked a supporting tradition in
colonial rule. Of particular consequence for the nature of
postcolonial rule was the power and position of the colonial Governor
within the colonial system.
The colonial Governor constituted a "one man government -241_
he "alone [was] responsible for the colony's administration. His
authority in the colony [was] practically autocratic."2"44 The powers of
240. CRAWFORD YOUNG, THE AFRICAN COLONIAL STATE IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 283 (1994).
241. Crawford Young, Africa: An Interim Balance Sheet, in DEMOCRATIZATION IN
AFRICA, supra note 43, at 64.
242. Peter J. Schraeder, Political Elites and the Process of Democratisation in Africa, in
THE DEMOCRATISATION OF DISEMPOWERMENT: THE PROBLEM OF DEMOCRACY IN
THE THIRD WORLD 44,46 (Jochen Hippler ed., 1995).




the Governor were not subject to any checks or brakes from below.
Not only did the colonial subjects lack a constitutional avenue for
removing him, "those who attacked him also risked the displeasure
lse-majest6 incurs." 245 In many African colonies, the Governor ruled
by decree or proclamation, and where the colonial constitution
included an Executive or Legislative Council, these played only an
advisory or deliberative role and were usually dominated by officials
of the Governor's administration.24 Where the Legislative Council
had an "unofficial" or representative majority, the Governor "had
certain 'reserved powers' by which he could invalidate legislation.,
24 7
The colonial judiciary, too, was not independent of the colonial
administration. To the contrary, the colonial judge was part and
parcel of the Governor's administration. He served as an adviser to
the Governor and assisted with the drafting of laws and policies. The
colonial chief justice even acted as governor in the latter's official
absence. The Governor had power to deny access to the colonial
courts for persons seeking to challenge the executive or legislative
acts of the colonial administration. As Nkrumah would later recall,
"the judiciary and the executive under a colonial regime are one and
the same thing., 248  Importantly, African nationalists' own harsh
experience of colonial justice, and of the political uses of the judicial
system, impressed on them the belief that "a Court [was] primarily...
the institution through which a government, Colonial or otherwise,
imposed its policy behind the cloak of magisterial propriety.,
249
Lastly, many of the oppressive laws that would later provide the
tools of repression for postcolonial Africa's rulers had their origin in
legislation enacted and enforced by the colonial state. Notably, the
preventive detention, sedition, and press censorship laws that became
a routine part of the legal paraphernalia of Africa's postcolonial
rulers had been first introduced and used during the colonial period.
In short, the postcolonial state and its practices, including, notably, its
245. Christopher Fyfe, The Legacy of Colonialism-Old Colony, New State, 25
PHYLON 247, 247 (1964) (lese-majestg is a crime against the dignity of a reigning
sovereign).
246. Id. See also Michael Crowder, Whose Dream was It Anyway? Twenty-Five Years
of African Independence, 86 AFRICAN AFFAIRS 7, 15 (1987); NKRUMAH, supra note 91, at
16.
247. NKRUMAH, supra note 91, at 17.
248. NKRUMAH, supra note 23, at 111.
249. GEOFFREY BING, REAP THE WHIRLWIND: AN ACCOUNT OF KWAME
NKRUMAH'S GHANA FROM 1950 TO 1966 215 (1968). Bing, a former British Labour MP,
was Nkrumah's first Attorney General.
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tendency toward presidential authoritarianism, showed remarkable
continuity with the colonial tradition and, in particular, with the
extraordinary power of the Governor within colonial society. In one
sense, then, independence meant, for Africa's new rulers, the "right
to use.., the same powers and methods of government which the
[c]olonial authorities had employed."'
b. Prevailing Comparative Models of Executive Power
The installation of imperial presidential rule in postcolonial
Africa was also influenced and aided indirectly by the models of
political governance and of executive power prevalent in the world's
leading political systems during the period of Africa's decolonization.
Africa's nationalist and postcolonial leaders received their political
socialization in a world dominated by the heroic leader. Theirs was,
in a real sense, the world of the modern imperial leader: Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, General de Gaulle, Adolph
Hitler, Josef Stalin, Mao Tse-tung. These "strong men at the helm,"
or their record and legacies, dominated politics in their respective
countries as well as on the world stage at the time of Africa's
nationalist emergence. And outside of the big post-war powers, an
emergent "Third World" was forming around the vision of leaders
like Tito (Yugoslavia), Sukarno (Indonesia), Jawaharal Nehru
(India), and Gamel Nasser (Egypt), a new generation of postcolonial
nation-builders-the "Bandung Generation""'-whose style and
orientation, like the African leaders who would soon join their ranks,
were staunchly nationalistic, anti-imperialistic, socialistic, and
authoritarian. Nkrumah, by his own account, counted Nehru, Lenin,
Mussolini, and Hitler among the twentieth century leaders whose
"methods" and "ideas" of political mobilization he "found much of
value." 2
In their quest for comparative and historical precedents, Africa's
postcolonial leaders also took favorable notice of the fact that, in the
United States, Franklin Delano Roosevelt's bold presidential
leadership, and in particular his government-led New Deal policies,
had successfully rescued the country and economy from the ravages
of the Great Depression. In fact, Nkrumah, who had lived for ten
250. Id. at 222.
251. PAUL JOHNSON, MODERN TIMES: THE WORLD FROM THE TWENTIES TO THE
NINETIES 466-505 (1991) (discussing the "Bandung Generation").
252. NKRUMAH, supra note 23, at vii-viii.
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years in Roosevelt's "New Deal" America as a young student,213
launched what he called "The New Deal" for the Gold Coast's cocoa
farmers soon upon becoming Leader of Government Business in the
colony. TM Later, as President of Ghana's first republic, Nkrumah
would use the example of Roosevelt's unsuccessful court-packing
plan to justify a proposed amendment to the Ghana constitution that
empowered him to dismiss judges of the superior courts.2 Similar
reliance was placed on the Roosevelt era by the authorities in
Nyerere's Tanzania when they decided to omit a judicially
enforceable Bill of Rights from their country's 1965 constitution. In
that instance, they referred to the "bitter conflict which arose in the
United States between the President and the Supreme Court as a
result of the radical measures enacted by the Roosevelt
Administration to deal with the economic depression in the 1930's
''26
to justify their denial of judicial review powers to the country's courts.
For Africa's postcolonial leadership, the lesson of Roosevelt's
"New Deal" presidency, apparently, was the task of achieving social
and economic transformation required strong and decisive
presidential leadership, unrestrained by judicial, or indeed any
constitutional, checks.27 The contemporaneous rise of China under
Mao Tse-tung and of the Soviet Union under Stalin, as well as the
impressive postwar reconstruction of Europe under the direction of
General Marshall, further confirmed for Africa's postcolonial leaders
the centrality of the state as an agent of development as well as the
indispensability of strong leadership for Africa's impoverished new
nations.
In the area of postcolonial constitutional design, an influential
comparative model at the time came from General de Gaulle's
constitution of the Fifth French Republic. Adopted in 1958 in
response to a series of postwar political, military and constitutional
253. Id. at 24-47 (describing his years in the United States).
254. Id. at 153.
255. See BRETON, supra note 74, at 91-92 (quoting statement by Nkrumah's
government on the 1964 amendment to the Constitution of Ghana).
256. See Robert B. Seidman, Constitutions in Independent, Anglophonic, Sub-Saharan
Africa: Form and Legitimacy, 1969 WisC. L. REV. 83, 105 (quoting Tanzanian Government
position).
257. See, e.g., NWABUEZE, supra note 21, at 110 ("Just as the economic depression of
the early 1930s called forth Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal measure, which was perhaps
the highest point presidential power had attained in peace-time America, so also does the
poverty of African societies aggregate power to the presidency.").
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258crises, the constitution of the Fifth French Republic restored and
reinforced the executive authority that, under the previous
constitution, had been suppressed in favor of legislative supremacy.
The most important feature of the constitution of the Fifth Republic
was a presidency with extraordinary powers-including, notably,
sweeping powers to deal with national emergencies, the right to
dismiss Parliament, and the right to legislate by referendum and thus
bypass the legislature. The legislature under the Fifth French
Republic possessed only specifically enumerated and limited powers.
All "residual" power was retained by the executive.
France's move toward a "monarchical republic.., with a
dominant executive and a weak, almost powerless parliament" z9
coincided roughly with the independence of her African colonies
during the 1960s.2" The constitution of the Fifth French Republic
thus served as the blueprint for the independent constitutions of
African's francophone states.26' In time, following the trend
pioneered by Nkrumah in Ghana, Africa's francophone states
amended their independence constitutions to eliminate the dual
executive inspired by the French model, creating, in the process, a
president-centered constitutional system-prsidentialisme renforc6-
that merely reinforced the hyper-presidentialism of the Gaullist
original.262
The influence of de Gaulle's constitution of 1958 on postcolonial
African constitutionalism arguably extended beyond francophone
Africa. Contrary to Nkrumah's suggestion that the constitutional
regime he had installed in 1960 Ghana was autochthonous, Leslie
Rubin and Pauli Murray, co-authors of a contemporaneous treatise
on the 1960 constitution of Ghana, argued that, "[i]n vesting the
President with wide powers, and conferring extraordinary powers on
the First President, with a corresponding reduction in the powers of
258. On the origins of the Fifth Republic and de Gaulle's role generally, see JEAN
LACOUTURE, DE GAULLE: THE RULER, 1945-1970 (Alan Sheridan trans. 1992)
(specifically chapter 16).
259. See BUSIA, supra note 108, at 51.
260. See SELASSIE, supra note 201, at 19-20.
261. See A.S. Alexander Jr., The Ivory Coast Constitution: An Accelerator, not a Brake,
1 J. MOD. AFR. STUDS. 293, 296-97 (1963) (noting French Fifth Republic-origins of 1959
constitution of Ivory Coast).
262. Id. at 297 (describing "one-man executive" of the 1960 Ivorian constitution as "no
longer encumbered by the trappings of the parliamentary system.., votes of confidence,
censure and dissolution.").
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the Parliament, the constitution of Ghana suggests the influence of
the Constitution of the Fifth Republic of France."263
In short, the trajectory of events and developments in the
political and constitutional life of postcolonial African states, and in
particular the emergence of presidential imperialism, was not entirely
endogenous in its sources of influence. Contemporaneous political
and constitutional trends and historical experiences (and
personalities) globally, and especially the examples of presidential
supremacy in the influential states of the post-war world, helped to
"normalize" similar tendencies and choices by Africa's postcolonial
leaders.
In invoking both the national integration and the development
rationales for their authoritarian projects, Africa's postcolonial
leaders had the additional authority of credible academic opinion on
their side.2 6  Of course there were prescient voices, like that of W.
Arthur Lewis, that argued the contrary position,265 but theirs was
decidedly a faint minority and, of course, went unheeded. At any
rate, there is no necessary causal link between either the "internal"
conditions or "external" influences identified above and the specific
choices made by Africa's postcolonial leadership. In the end, the
implantation of presidential autocracy in Africa cannot be explained
,,266as a "co-production, responsibility for which must be shared with
263. RUBIN & MURRAY, supra note 86, at 32. See also AFTER, supra note 83, at 355
("Ironically enough, if one were to look for formal parallels in Europe, the constitution
which most resembles Ghana's is that of De Gaulle .... ").
264. See, e.g., WALLERSTEIN, supra note 209, at 163 ("The structural prerequisites for
[a multiparty parliamentary system] do not yet exist to a sufficient degree in Africa...
The one-party system in the African context is often a significant step toward the liberal
state, not a first step away from it."); L.P. Mair, Social Change in Africa, 36 INT'L AFFAIRS
447, 456 (Oct. 1960) ("Since the unity of the new [African] States is so precarious, it may
well be that their rulers cannot at present afford that tolerance of opposition which is the
ideal of representative democracy... The crucial problem for the new governments seems
likely to be how to be authoritarian enough to maintain stability and carry through their
modernizing policies, and yet not so obviously oppressive as to provoke active or passive
resistance.").
265. See W. ARTHUR LEWIS, POLITICS IN WEST AFRICA 89 (1965) ("As for our
political scientists, they fall all over themselves to demonstrate that democracy is suitable
only for Europeans and North Americans, and in the sacred names of 'charisma,'
'modernization' and 'national unity,' call upon us to admire any demagogue who, aided by
a loud voice and a bunch of hooligans, captures the state and suppresses his rivals.").
266. Africa historian Frederick Cooper has observed that "economic problems in
Africa have long been coproductions." Thus "to talk about 'African economies' as if they
were truly African, while international financial institutions and transnational
corporations are 'givens' to which Africans must adjust, is to stifle thinking about
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others beyond Africa's postcolonial elites.267  That the atmosphere
and conditions of the early postcolonial period created an "autocratic
temptation" of sorts may be readily conceded.2" But circumstance, or
"opportunity," alone does not dictate agency or outcome. While
leaders like Julius Nyerere 269 were sincere and disciplined in their
commitment or belief, in Africa, as elsewhere, personal ambition, and
oftentimes a sense of "manifest destiny" or indispensability, supplied
an important motive that drove some of Africa's leaders toward the
autocratic path. Nkrumah, for example, expressed such
"indispensable man" sentiments as far back as 1953,270 and also
expressed the opinion, prior to Ghana's independence, that
''emergency measures of a totalitarian kind" might need to be
employed "in the period following independence.,
271
In the end, the justifications offered for presidential
authoritarianism-and its accompaniments of a one-party regime and
unitary centralism-were not confirmed by the results. While some
countries, such as Tanzania and Nkrumah's Ghana, recorded modest
to impressive strides particularly in the areas of education and health,
as well as, in Ghana's case especially, in the area of public works
economic change from the start." FREDERICK COOPER, AFRICA SINCE 1940: THE PAST
OF THE PRESENT 118 (2002). Given the deep and direct entanglement of international
financial institutions and external donors and financiers in the management of the
postcolonial economy, Cooper's insight is hard to refute. With respect to the choice of
political or regime forms, however, African elites have demonstrated a substantial degree
of autonomy and initiative, even if "outside forces" have helped prop up dictatorships for
their own strategic interests.
267. See MEREDITH, supra note 25 at 164, 250 (quoting one Lansine Kabina describing
Guinea as "a one-man show, in which [President Sekou] Toure was the sole actor, while
others danced, applauded or sang in his honor according to him whim .... Nyerere took
on the drive to socialism virtually single-handedly. There was no inner group around him
committed to socialism; no body of thinking within the ruling party; no working-class
agitation; no militant peasantry; no popular expectation of radical change. It was
Nyerere's own aspirations, his own ideology, that determined government policy.").
268. See, e.g., K.A. BUSIA, THE CHALLENGE OF AFRICA 141 ("In Africa, where
parliamentary institutions are new, and where there is such a massive preponderance of
conditions favoring authoritarian rule, the battle for personal liberty and democracy is a
hard one."). Dr. Busia was Opposition Leader in Nkrumah's Ghana before he went into
exile to escape a detention order.
269. In the end, Julius Nyerere admitted the failure of his Ujamaa policies and stepped
down from the presidency, allowing multi-party elections to be held even without popular
pressure from the Tanzanian people.
270. Richard Wright, the African-American novelist, records that in a conversation
with Nkrumah during Wright's visit to the Gold Coast in 1953 Nkrumah stated: "There are
but two or three of us who know what we are doing." RICHARD WRIGHT, BLACK
POWER: A RECORD OF REACTIONS IN THE LAND OF PATIOS 63 (1953).
271. NKRUMAH, supra note 23, at x.
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projects, it is not clear that any of that initial progress required
"emergency measures of a totalitarian kind. 22  To the contrary,
populist autocracy stifled the growth of an independent middle class
and caused African states to lose or waste scarce professional and
intellectual talent at precisely the time when these new societies
needed most such critical human resources. In the end, even the
initial burst of progress could not be sustained. Nor was the African
state or economy transformed; both have remained distinctly
neocolonial. Africa, indeed, has had no "authoritarian advantage" to
273report.
Instead of development and social improvement, most African
states and populations have suffered perennial economic crises,
diminished living standards, and sharp inequalities in wealth and
regional development."4 And instead of national integration, over-
centralized one-man rule has often deepened social cleavages, caused
political instability, and, in some cases, fueled civil war and national
disintegration. In fact it was the inescapable failure and
unsustainability of the authoritarian project that ultimately
precipitated the crisis of legitimacy-and the crisis of governance-
across Africa at the end of the 1980s. Why, then, despite its dismal
record and the recent popular backlash against personal rule, does
presidential imperialism persist in contemporary Africa?
IV. Why Imperial Presidency Persists: Pitfalls and Limitations
of Contemporary Constitutional Design in Africa
As the discussion in Part II has sought to demonstrate, Africa's
postcolonial tradition of imperial presidency is not an organic
outgrowth of indigenous "African culture" or traditional systems of
government. Rather, as a form of rule, it was purposefully and
systematically constructed at the dawn of African independence by
Africa's nationalist elites to answer certain specific regime needs at
the time, and its "successful" implantation in the early postcolonial
272. Id. at p.x.
273. See Cyril Daddieh, Beyond Gorvenance and Democratization in Africa: Toward
State Building for Sustainable Human Development, 1 J. SUSTAINABLE DEV'T 10
(Winter/Spring 1999) ("[Florty years of authoritarianism had failed to produce a single
case of authoritarian development regimes (growth with development) A la Taiwan,
[South] Korea, and China or even authoritarian growth regimes (growth without
development or welfare) la Brazil under the military junta.").
274. See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 266, at 156 ("By the 1970s in most African states,
the development slogan had become either tragedy or farce ....").
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period was conditioned or facilitated by certain historical and
external factors.
The times have changed, however. While development remains
Africa's foremost challenge, the autocratic temptation of the early
decades of African independence appears to have given way to a
democratic imperative. Significant, the influential, larger-than-life
architects of Africa's imperial presidency have exited the political
scene, some of them forced out dishonorably. All of these changes
have made the period after 1989 a "constitutional moment" of sorts
for postcolonial Africa, the first such moment since the momentous
independence decade of the 1960s. The post-1989 constitutional
reforms across sub-Saharan Africa were thought to have reflected this
"paradigm shift" in thinking about politics and governance in Africa.
In light of this expectation, the continued survival of presidential
imperialism in contemporary Africa raises questions about the
content and depth of the recent transitions and related constitutional
reforms.
Renewed calls in Africa's emerging democracies for fresh
constitutional reforms suggest growing disappointment and
dissatisfaction with the round of constitutional revisions that
accompanied the democratic transition. The main focus of these
complaints has been the persistence or re-emergence of presidential
imperialism, a grievance that was successfully mobilized most recently
in Kenya to defeat a president-backed draft constitution."'
On paper, and compared to predecessor constitutions, the
constitutions of contemporary African states appear to announce the
dawn of a new era of constitutionalism. Africa's "new and improved"
constitutions abolish de jure one-party rule and rule by decree;
protect the right of political parties to compete in regularly scheduled
presidential and legislative elections; restore traditional lawmaking
and oversight functions to legislatures; replace indefinite presidential
tenure with term limits; empower the courts to rule on the
constitutionality of challenged executive or legislative acts; and
protect from arbitrary violation or abuse a set of rights and liberties
associated with modern democracy, including, the right to freedom of
association, free speech and press freedom. In addition, in several
African states, there is now a "fourth branch of government" on the
constitutional scene, comprising a variety of specialized independent




commissions or public agencies that are charged with bringing
credibility and political detachment to the performance of such
critical functions as conducting and managing public elections,
investigating cases and allegations of public corruption, protecting the
independence and fairness of the media, investigating and remedying
human rights abuses, and auditing and reporting on the allocation and
use of public funds. In light of the above, it is easily understandable
why a literal reader of one typical African constitution would describe
it as "a remarkable document of liberty. 276 How, then, in the face of
these constitutional reforms, has presidential supremacy managed to
survive in contemporary Africa? Must one conclude, given the
persistence of the imperial presidency in Africa, that constitutions
and constitutional design do not matter?
Constitutions do matter, of course-given auspicious political
circumstances. Some of the changes that have followed in the wake
of constitutional reform in many African states, including, notably,
the incremental, and in some cases remarkable, improvement in the
quality of personal liberty and media freedom, the successful
legislative blocking of presidential bids for extended terms of office,
and the instances of orderly regime succession upon the expiry of
term limits or electoral defeat. This confirms that constitutional rules
can induce, or at least condition, certain positive social and political
outcomes. At the same time, there is much that a textual or literal
reading of a constitution-any constitution-cannot reveal about the
reality and dynamics of constitutional politics. A constitution may be
"an extraordinary document, 2 77 as Schlesinger believed the U.S.
Constitution to be. But it is still "only a document, and what the
Constitution 'really' meant-i.e., meant in practice-only practice
could disclose." 278 Moreover, even as documents, constitutions are
neither exhaustive nor foolproof regarding the matters they regulate.
Omissions and contradictions are frequently embedded in the text of
constitutions. All of these limitations associated with constitutions
generally are true of Africa's new and revised constitutions.
The content of Africa's contemporary constitution design should
also be viewed within the context of the primary or immediate
impulse that drove the recent transition. Africa's recent
constitutional reforms did not occur behind a Rawlsian "veil of
276. Bertrand de Rossanet, The Ghanaian Constitutionalism of Liberty, 60 THE REV.
47, 47 (1998).
277. SCHLESINGER, supra note 11, at 13.
278. Id.
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ignorance"279 involving a cast of moral actors embarked on a
principled and idealistic quest for a "just" social and constitutional
order. Both on the side of the coalition of regime opponents, civic
leaders, and democracy and human rights activists that led the
popular push for reform and on the side of the besieged incumbents
who needed to find a credible way forward out of the crisis of
legitimacy they were confronted with, the motives behind the
democratic transition and accompanying constitutional reforms were
mixed and, often, opportunistic. In many instances, regime
opponents and 'new democrats' were themselves "recycled elites" cut
from the same political cloth as the discredited incumbents.2" In
some cases too, where an authoritarian regime was strong enough at
the time of transition to have retained control of the transition
timetable and the reform agenda, as was the case in Ghana, Tanzania
and Uganda, the ensuing constitutional revisions were often done
with regime continuity in mind. Overall, then, the reform ambition
and possibilities were limited. In the main, the objective was to
democratize-and thereby re-legitimate-government by creating an
opportunity and a mechanism for political contestation and possible
regime change or power alternation through the ballot box. In
general, Africa's current constitutions must be seen as reflecting this
limited ambition. Inevitably, then, certain important aspects or
features of the ancien r~gime did not make it onto the reform agenda.
The most important omission in this regard is the centralization
of the postcolonial state. Contemporary constitutional design in
Africa is notable for its failure to tinker with or alter in any way the
territorial distribution of power within the state. Despite the
resilience of sub-national identities and the strength of "local
patriotism," it is hard to find a serious constituency or strongly held
sentiment for federalism among Africa's influential elites. The
obvious exception is Nigeria, where regional resistance to the
centralizing impulses of successive national (military) elites remains
strong, even though the country has maintained since independence a
279. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Harvard Univ. Press 1972).
280. See Richard Joseph, Africa: States in Crisis, 14 J. DEMOCRACY 159, 165 (2003)
("In Nigeria, the roster of presidential candidates in the April 2003 elections included
many who have held executive, parliamentary, and other political positions over the
decades of predatory military and civilian governments."); see also Nicolas van de Walle,
The Impact of Multi-Party Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1 FORUM FOR DEV. STUD. 5
(2001), available at http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?servicelD=
EINIRAS&fileid=072A78A5-CF08-6BDE-FE22-846467BA8E13&lng=en (identifying
past regime affiliations of some of Africa's "new" leaders).
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nominally federal system of government. Generally, however, elite
consensus across Africa appears to be firmly behind preserving the
unitary state model, and contemporary constitutional design reflects
this implicit consensus. While decentralization, and thus the idea of
local self-government within a unitary state model, has growing
support, recent constitutional reforms in Africa have done little to
transform or empower local government. Local administration, not
local government, still best describes the role played by local councils
and officials within the contemporary African state. In short, one of
the structural pillars upon which presidential hegemony in
postcolonial Africa was built, namely, the highly centralized unitary
state, remains firmly in place.
As a consequence, African governments are, doctrinally
speaking, still governments of general powers, not of enumerated or
limited powers. In other words, unless the applicable constitution
precludes or prohibits it from doing so, the government of the typical
African state, because it has yielded none of its sovereign power to a
sub-national entity, generally has plenary authority to act or legislate
on all matters. In such a constitutional system, where there is no
"vertical" countervailing power (other than periodic elections) to
restrain the central government, the extent of presidential power-
and thus whether the presidency will show imperial tendencies-will
depend, by and large, on the "horizontal" distribution and balance of
power between the presidency and the other branches and agencies of
the central state. How, then, have Africa's new constitutions handled
the horizontal dimension of the power map of the state? The focus of
our discussion will be on the executive-legislature relationship, and,
to a limited extent, on judicial power and the institutions of the
"fourth branch of government"-the so-called agencies of horizontal
accountability.
A. Legislature-Executive Relations in Contemporary Africa
In the recent transition from authoritarianism to democratic
politics in Africa, "not a single democratizing state chose to move
[from a presidential] to a parliamentary form of government. ... "'
Of course, the vesting of executive power in a president does not, by
itself, connote or preordain presidential supremacy. Nor, as
Singapore's experience under Lee Kuan Yew or Britain's experience
under Margaret Thatcher or Tony Blair demonstrates, does the
281. van de Walle, supra note 280, at 31.
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Westminster parliamentary form, in which executive power is
exercised by a cabinet headed by a prime minister, preclude "prime
ministerial" dominance within the constitutional system.
At any rate, while most African constitutions have retained the
executive presidency, only a few can be said to be patterned after the
classical presidential form, in which the president operates within a
constitutional framework of institutional checks and balances-which
is not to suggest, knowing U.S. constitutional history to prove the
contrary, that the 'pure' form of presidentialism is invulnerable to
presidential imperialism either. Of Africa's newly emerging
democracies, Nigeria and Liberia, with their popularly elected
presidents and separate two-house legislatures, come closest to
imitating the U.S. form. Most contemporary African constitutions,
however, tend toward the "hybrid" model.2  In Francophone and
Lusophone Africa, this has been accomplished primarily by restoring
the position of prime minister, thus returning, essentially, to the
bicephalous executive of the Gaullist model.23 In the Anglophone
African states that have adopted the hybrid form, such as Zambia,
Uganda and Ghana, a nationally elected president typically governs
with a cabinet of ministers all or a majority of whom may (or, in the
case of Ghana, must) be selected from among current members of
parliament.
Regardless of the specific form it takes, hybridization in
contemporary African constitutional design has meant blending the
"pro-executive" features of the parliamentary form (such as drawing
the president's ministers from the current membership of parliament)
with the "pro-executive" features of the presidential form (such as a
veto-wielding unitary president; fixed term of office for the president;
and a presidential cabinet whose tenure does not depend on the
support of parliament).' Thus, rather than restrain presidential
power, the hybrid form has tended to facilitate or embolden it. Still,
282. See Muna Ndulo, Presidentialism in the Southern African States and Constitutional
Restraint on Presidential Power, 26 VT. L. REV. 769, 772 (2002) ("In most African states
the basic structure of the political system is neither parliamentary nor presidential; it is a
hybrid .... ).
283. See Mpazi Sinjela, Constitutionalism in Africa: Emerging Trends, 60 THE REV. 23,
27 (1998) ("The constitutional reforms in Francophone African countries have ...
signal[]ed a return to the independence constitutions model[]ed after that of France."); see
also HYDEN, supra note 48, at 108.
284. See Momba, supra note 66, at 117 ("[Tlhe hybrid system was engineered to give
the president all of the powers that go with presidential systems without a relative
independence of legislature often associated with 'pure' presidential systems.").
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the fact that presidential imperialism remains a fact of political life
even in a state like Nigeria, where the executive and legislative
branches are formally separated t la the American constitutional
form, suggests that the hybrid constitutional design alone cannot
account for the persistence of the presidential hegemony in
contemporary Africa.
Indeed from a textual or formal standpoint, few of Africa's new
constitutions can be said to compel or enact an imperial presidency.
The constitutions of Angola and Cameroon and Congo (Brazzaville),
which grant the president unilateral authority over appointments to a
broad range of key executive, judicial and other constitutional offices
and empower the president to bypass the legislature and legislate or
govern without the legislature's participation even in non-emergency
situations, are exceptional among contemporary African constitutions
in virtually imposing or preordaining an imperial presidency.
Tanzania follows closely, as the "structure of the national presidency
of Tanzania has not changed substantially since 1985 when Nyerere
left office." '285 The Tanzanian president is still empowered to declare
a state of emergency and make key appointments to cabinet positions
and the offices of prime minister and chief justice, all without
obtaining the approval of the legislature.6 Outside of these glaring
examples of constitutionally-implied presidential hegemony, modern
African constitutions generally do not affirmatively grant the
president exclusive or unilateral authority to act or govern. Presiding
over governments of general powers, contemporary African
presidents no doubt have immense authority. However, by
constitutional command, they typically must now seek and secure
prior legislative approval in the form of an Act of Parliament (or a
binding resolution of parliament) for all of their intended actions that
would have the force of law, including, notably, proposed legislation
or subsidiary legislation, proposed budgets or supplementary budgets,
proposed foreign borrowing or international transactions,
nominations to ministerial and judicial offices, and proposed
amendments to the constitution. In addition, the legislature has
power under several African constitutions to impeach the president
or launch parliamentary inquires into the conduct of executive
departments and officials. Thus, on paper at least, most
285. Ndegwa & Letourneau, supra note 69, at 96.
286. See id.
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contemporary African constitutions appear to empower parliaments
to check presidential power.
Are African newly representative legislatures, then, to blame for
not failing to rein in the imperial presidency in post-authoritarian
Africa? Formalistically speaking, the answer is yes-at least in some
cases. Arthur Schlesinger's insight, based on his study of the rise of
imperial presidency in the United States, is equally true of
contemporary Africa: the phenomenon is "as much a matter of
[legislative] abdication as of presidential usurpation." 7 For example,
despite the fact that, under the typical African constitution, the
election of the speaker of the legislature is a power vested collectively
in the legislators themselves, in practice legislative majorities (usually
of the president's party) have tended to yield to the president's
known preference for the position. As the speaker determines what
business may be done and what matters said in the legislative
chamber, de facto presidential control over the speaker's gavel
significantly inhibits the ability of the legislature, and in particular
opposition parties, to ensure executive accountability."
Other examples of legislative abdication or self-subordination to
the presidency abound in contemporary Africa. In Ghana, for
example, parliament approved legislation in 2001 that empowers the
president to create, merge, or abolish ministries and departments of
the executive branch at will, without the need to obtain specific
legislative approval for each such governmental expansion or
reorganization. This is equivalent to giving the U.S. president a
standing authorization to create and staff any number of new
departments of the federal government or to abolish an existing
department without an Act of Congress. In effect, the Ghanaian
president is legislatively empowered to expand the presidency and the
executive branch ad infinitum, without regard to the budget cycle and
without recourse to the legislature for approval. What explains this
capitulation of Africa's new legislatures to the presidency they are
supposed to check?
In structuring the formal relationship between the president and
parliament, contemporary constitutional policy in Africa has typically
followed a passive or "open-ended" approach, dividing governmental
287. SCHLESINGER, supra note 11, at ix.
288. In Zambia, for example, a petition to initiate impeachment proceedings against
President Chiluba failed despite meeting the minimum constitutional requirements,
because the speaker refused to convene the legislature for that purpose. See Momba,
supra note 66, at 114-115.
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powers between the executive and the legislature and leaving laws
and policies to be made through the dynamic political interaction
between the president and the legislature. The implicit assumption is
that, once granted countervailing power in a constitution, Africa's
legislatures will, in fact, use their power to check presidential
overreaching.
Within the extant African political context, however, a
constitutional plan that went even as far as to provide juridical
equality between the president and the legislature (leaving the two
branches to "deal" or decide matters jointly), would still, in its
practical operation, tend to skew the balance of power toward
presidential dominance. The reason is not farfetched. The African
president has at his disposal such vast extraconstitutional (political)
resources and advantages vis-A-vis the legislature (and legislators),
that, except in the event of "divided government," expectations that
Africa's current legislatures might act to check or restrain
presidential power have generally failed to materialize. More than
explicit constitutional design, it is these political resources and
advantages held by African presidents that continue to underwrite
presidential imperialism in contemporary Africa. These inherent
advantages come from diverse sources.
First, contemporary Africa's political parties are themselves
"presidentialist" in their orientation. The capture of the presidential
office, above everything else, is what primarily drives multi-party
rivalry-and indeed the formation of parties-in much of
contemporary Africa. Legislative elections, though vigorously
contested, are treated as "sideshows" to the main event," which is the
presidential election. The reason is simple: the presidency is where
"rents" and "patronage" resources-contracts, jobs, licenses, waivers,
budgets, aid, perks, etc.--continue to be lodged. As a result, majority
parties in Africa, both old and new, have tended to behave like
"mutual benefit societies," using control of the state more for
factional patronage than for enacting and implementing public-
regarding policy preferences. Thus, where, as is typically the case, the
presidential party also commands a parliamentary majority (either
289. van de Walle, supra note 66, at 315.
290. LORD, supra note 14, at 83
291. Id.
292. See, e.g., Momba, supra note 66, at 115 ("[T]he ruling party has not taken kindly
to Members of Parliament who have exercised independent stances in the national
assembly.").
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alone or through voting coalitions), it is expected that the party's
members of parliament will toe the president's line. In consequence,
the Burkean conception of political parties as providing "a sort of
extraconstitutional check on the executive or would-be executive, 29
primarily by pre-committing the party's candidates for presidential
office to a policy-oriented "party program that is tolerably
representative of the views and interests of important segments of
society, 29' does not describe current practice in Africa. In Africa's
zero-sum political environment, where partisan rivalry is primarily
over control of patronage, not about ideology or policy, the majority
party's legislative support for the president is assured as long as the
president is willing to use the prerogatives of his office to advance the
material interests of the party and its members.
As a result, "conscience voting" by majority-party legislators is
strongly disfavored, especially if it means voting against the will of the
party's president.'92 In some cases, the problem has been exacerbated
or sanctioned by the constitutional text itself. In Malawi, for
example, one influential view of section 65 of the country's
constitution would make cross-party voting against the wishes of
one's party grounds for forfeiture of one's seat in parliament.2 93 The
Sierra Leonean constitution is more explicit: A legislator's seat may
be declared vacant "if by his conduct in Parliament by sitting and
voting with members of a different party, the Speaker is satisfied after
consultation with the Leader of the Member's party that the Member
is no longer a member of the political party under whose symbol he
was elected to Parliament.,
29 4
The president's political leverage over his party's legislators is
particularly enhanced in the hybrid constitutional form where the
president has the power to constitute his administration largely or
entirely from the ranks of members of parliament. In Zambia,
President Chiluba appointed as nearly half the total number of MPs
to ministerial or other executive branch positions within his
administration.295 In Ghana, recent presidents have used similar
power granted to them by Ghana's constitution to appoint a large
number of his party's MPs (and nearly all of the most influential
293. See Nixon S. Khembo, The Multiparty Promise Betrayed: The Failure of Neo-
Liberalism in Malawi, XXIX AFRICA DEVELOPMENT 80, 81-82 (2004).
294. SIERRA LEONE CONST. art. 77 (1).
295. See Ndulo, supra note 282, at 786.
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ones) to his cabinet and administration.296 In fact, in such hybrid
regimes, the ambition of many legislators, in contesting election to
parliament, is to secure subsequent presidential appointment to the
executive branch, not to build a legislative career. The promise or
prospect of such an appointment is thus an important carrot with
which presidents in Africa's hybrid systems are able to bend even the
backbenchers in parliament to the executive's wishes.
Second, the respective institutional histories of the presidency
and parliament in postcolonial Africa place Africa's newly
representative legislatures at a clear disadvantage. Unlike the
executive branch, which can count on a history of unbroken
organizational existence, many of Africa's parliaments have suffered
substantial gaps in their institutional lives since independence; those
that have a record of continuous existence operated largely in single-
party regimes and, therefore, have little experience of autonomy.
2 9
The absence of a tradition of parliamentary existence or autonomy
means that most of Africa's current legislatures lack a clear
conception of their institutional prerogatives, and have little in the
way of helpful precedents from their past to fall back on. It also
explains, in part, why despite its lawmaking and budget authorization
functions, the typical African parliament does not have its own
legislative drafting staff, a budget office, or a research department.
The technical expertise and the supporting bureaucracy in these areas
have long been part and parcel of the executive branch, and that is
where they remain to this day. In short, while the contemporary
African presidency inherits a well-developed and bold (if ancien
r6gime-derived) conception of the nature and scope of its executive
power, its legislative counterpart has a self-limiting and uncertain
conception of the legislature's role.
Given the divergent histories and backgrounds of the presidency
and the legislature in Africa, current president-legislature relations
reflect strong elements of path dependency. 9s The executive branch
296. See, e.g., Ghana Center for Democratic Development, Revisiting the Matter of the
Size of the President's Ministerial Team, 6/1 DEMOCRACY WATCH 12, Mar. 2005.
297. The Kenyan parliament had a tradition of vibrant deliberation and intra-party
factionalism even during the one-party era. But its substantive powers were still marginal
vis-A-vis the president.
298. See Thandika Mkandaware, Crisis Management and the Making of "Choiceless
Democracies," in STATE, CONFLICT, AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 125 (Richard Joseph
ed., 1999) ("Democratic states that are built on the ruins of authoritarian rule often retain
some of the previous state's institutions, which linger on due to social inertia and
structural rigidities.").
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in Africa has too long been accustomed to governing without external
(domestic) restraint, and the legislature not used to checking or
disciplining the executive, that, on their own, neither institution is
likely to change the familiar pattern. The force of path dependency
also means that longstanding patterns of presidential behavior about
which the current constitution might be silent come to be accepted as
normal and appropriate and thus continue to be followed uncritically.
For example, presidents in contemporary Africa, following past
practice, routinely appoint MPs to serve as directors on corporate
boards in the public commercial sector, despite the obvious conflict of
interests inherent in such cross-branch appointments. Conventions
and modes of operation established in the president-dominated
ancien r~gime continue to shape political behavior and inter-branch
politics in the present-and to the detriment of effective presidential
accountability.
Third, although in theory African legislatures hold the power of
the purse, as they must approve and pre-authorize the executive's
taxing and spending proposals for each fiscal period, in practice
control over the national budget and treasury resides with the
president and his minister of finance. Importantly, under most
African constitutions only the executive may initiate, introduce or
amend a bill that has the purpose or effect of raising taxes or
imposing a charge on the national treasury2 -with the legislature's
role limited to approving or rejecting the president's proposed budget
in its entirety. The commonly cited rationale for denying parallel
legislative initiative to individual legislators in matters affecting public
finances is to discipline the legislature and curb legislators' presumed
appetite for fiscally irresponsible constituent-or special-interest-
driven "pork barrel" politics. The effect of such exclusion, however,
is to grant the president monopoly control over "pork."
In light of Africa's longstanding postcolonial tradition of
neopatrimonialism or clientelism centered around the presidency, a
constitutional policy that grants the president monopoly over the
allocation of "pork" entrenches presidential supremacy within the
state. Indeed, insofar as exclusive executive control of the scope and
size of the national budget extends to the legislature's own
institutional budget, it enables the president to manipulate and
undermine the formal independence and checking functions of the
legislature simply by starving it of needed resources or reducing
299. See, e.g., GHANA CONST. art. 108 (1992).
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parliament and its leadership to supplicants who must plead with and
curry favor with the president in order to obtain the resources they
need to operate. Moreover, for Africa's legislators, under pressure
from their constituents to meet incessant demands for help with
individual educational, medical or funeral expenses,3°° "constituency
service" often trumps oversight and other traditional legislative
responsibilities as the legislator's most important expected role.30' As
it is the African executive that controls patronage resources, a
conception of the legislator's role that puts a premium on
constituency service, above all else, makes legislators easily
vulnerable to executive capture or co-optation.
The fact that Africa's are disproportionately financed, not from
direct taxation but from "rents"-whether in the form of revenues
from the extraction of natural resources, marketing board profits
from primary commodity exports, or external donor assistance-
undermines the prospect of a "fiscal social contract" between
government and the citizenry and thus further diminishes the
influence of the legislature (vis-A-vis the executive) in the area of
public finance." Indeed, the ministry of finance, not parliament or its
finance or budget committee, has remained the main route through
which external donors and multilateral financiers engage with and
channel aid and assistance to African governments.3 3  Even
parliament itself must depend, by and large, on the good graces of the
finance minister-and thus of the president-for adequate resources
for both legislators and the legislative institution itself. In the
process, Africa's parliaments have remained marginal players in the
area of public finance. With the executive effectively controlling
access to the nation's purse strings, it is the executive, not parliament,
that is best able to call the tune.
300. See Joel Barkan, Legislative Development in Africa 3-4 (2007) (unpublished
manuscript) (copy with author).
301. Id.
302. Robert Bates has argued that only when African rulers are compelled to negotiate
with their own populations for the public revenues they need to govern will a genuine
transition from authoritarianism be possible. See Robert Bates, The Economic Bases of
Democratization, in STATE, CONFLICT AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 45, at 83-89.
303. See Thandika Mkandaware, supra note 298 at 125. ("Aid in Africa has historically
existed within essentially authoritarian structures, and a whole tradition of interaction
between foreign donors and African governments has been premised on this institutional
practice. Aid relationships remained unencumbered by the complexities of national
debate or consensus building in the recipient country .... ").
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Fourth, presidential supremacy in Africa continues to benefit
politically from a widespread and persistent belief among influential
sections of the African polity that what Africa lacks but sorely needs
is a "strong" or "visionary" leader. The famous assertion by Nigerian
novelist and essayist, Chinua Achebe, that, "The trouble with Nigeria
is simply and squarely a failure of leadership,"' sums up the feeling
of many contemporary Africans about the source of-and, thus, the
solution to-their national crises of governance and
underdevelopment.3 5 Tolerance for presidential autocracy or "bad
leaders" may have worn thin in Africa's democratizing polities, but,
insofar as overcoming underdevelopment remains the primary
concern of most Africans, belief in the beneficent uses of
preponderant presidential power remains fairly strong. In fact,
among influential segments of the African elite, Lee Kuan Yew's
"Singapore Story," popularized in recent years by his influential
memoirs,' appears to have revived or stirred up an "autocrat envy"
of sorts.3 07
Problematizing the African crisis in a personalistic or leader-
centered way (as opposed to focusing on policy and institutional
development) thus continues to work to underwrite vast presidential
power in the name of visionary and reform-minded leadership. This
is not to say that leadership does not matter. Africa's leadership
deficit is real. But it is a deficit that extends far beyond the
presidential office; it afflicts, to an even more debilitating degree, all
the institutions of state and local government, and the postcolonial
tradition of presidential hegemony has much to blame for this.
Moreover, quiet apart from oversimplifying the Singapore story, the
problem with the leader-centered view of Africa's crisis is that there
is as yet no known science for replicating, sustaining or
304. CHINUA ACHEBE, THE TROUBLE WITH NIGERIA 1 (1983).
305. See, e.g., Simon Robinson, Africa's Game of Follow the Leader, TIME, Nov. 26,
2005.
306. See generally LEE KUAN YEW, FROM THIRD WORLD TO FIRST: THE SINGAPORE
STORY: 1965-2000 (2000). For another perspective of the Singapore story, highlighting the
crucial roles played by other, less-well-known members of the Singaporean political class,
see LEE'S LIEUTENANTS: SINGAPORE'S OLD GUARD (Lam Peng Er & Kevin YI Tan,
eds., 1999).
307. See, e.g., Ruhakana Ruganda, A Changing Uganda: A Government Perspective,
CHALLENGES AND CHANGE IN UGANDA (Woodrow Wilson Center, 2005) ("What
Uganda needs now, in order to bring about the transformation of its economy, is a
visionary leadership such as that of Mr. Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore."), available at
www.wilsoncenter.org/ topics/pubsfUganda2.pdf.
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institutionalizing a Lee Kuan Yew in contemporary Africa (or
anywhere else, for that matter). In fact, as Africa's painful experience
with messianic ideologies (including the dismal record of the "new
generation" of leaders) amply demonstrates trusting in heroic
leadership-and thus allowing any one person to aggrandize or wield
disproportionate power in the name of "development"-is not only
short-sighted, it often disappoints3 -and at great cost to institutional
development and civil liberties.
Except as to term limits, however, this cautionary tale from
Africa's postcolonial experience is not adequately reflected in
contemporary constitutions in Africa. As currently designed, Africa's
democratic constitutions rely too greatly on the vagaries of day-to-
day politics, on legislative self-assertion, or else on presidential self-
restraint to tame the pervasive tendencies and temptations toward
presidential imperialism. In so doing, contemporary constitutional
design in Africa not only ignores the persistence of structural
rigidities from the past, it appears to rest on a view of power and of
human nature that is anything but realistic.
1. Is "Divided Government" the Remedy?
The one real possibility that exists, within Africa's contemporary
constitutional systems, for a legislature effectively to "check" or
restrain presidential action is in the event of a "divided government."
That is when the presidency and the legislature fall under the control
of rival parties. In many African constitutions a "run off" election or
second round of balloting is required to select a president when the
first round of presidential elections has failed to produce a winner
with an absolute majority. In others, such as Angola, the term of
office of president is not co-terminus with the legislative term. Either
scenario could give rise to divided government.
The possibility is not just theoretical. There have been instances
of divided government in post-transition Africa. Madagascar, Benin,
Niger and Congo are among the African states where, following
elections, the president failed to secure a clear majority or a working
coalition in the national legislature. While this state of affairs enabled
308. See generally George B.N. Ayittey, Why Africa is Poor, in SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: PROMOTING PROGRESS OR PERPETUATING POVERTY (Julian Morris
ed., 2002).
309. See Thomas Carothers, The 'Sequencing' Fallacy, 18 J. DEMOCRACY 12, 15 (2007)
("Bluntly stated, for every Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore there have been dozens or even
hundreds of rapacious, repressive autocrats posing as reformers .... ").
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the legislatures in question to "check" presidential action (literally
speaking), the record shows that divided government is not a
desirable antidote to the problem of presidential imperialism in
Africa.
In the United States, where the tradition is well established,
divided government, though associated with "gridlock" in
Washington, has little chance of producing a paralysis in the running
of the country as a whole. For one thing, the United States operates a
federal constitutional system, where most of the everyday concerns of
citizens (e.g., education, public safety, mass transportation, and
sanitation) fall within the jurisdiction and responsibility of state and
local governments with independent taxing power. Thus, in the U.S.,
partisan gridlock at the federal level, even where it leads to a
temporary shutdown of the business of the federal government itself
will not create a nationwide governance crisis or administrative
nightmare. The same cannot be said about divided government in
Africa.
First, Africa's postcolonial history of president-controlled one-
party regimes and military juntas effectively precluded an experience
of divided government. Second, African states remain highly
centralized unitary states. Thus all public administration, including
regional and local administrations, must rely on one central
government for operational resources and direction. Under these
circumstances, divided government is a sure recipe for nationwide
governmental paralysis and potentially destabilizing political crisis.
Such indeed is the lesson of Africa's recent experience with divided
government.
In both Congo and Niger, the governmental paralysis generated
by divided government eventually gave the military cause to
intervene and bring an end to their country's young democratic
project. In Benin, divided government "paralysed reform for many
months and compromised the government's capacity to undertake
further policy reform. '31 And latterly in Malawi, where President
Bingu wa Mutharika and his former party (which has a working
majority in parliament) have parted ways over the party's objections
to the president's stance against corruption, parliament's refusal to
bring the president's budget to a vote threatens to precipitate a
constitutional and political crisis.
310. van de Walle, Impact of Multi-Party, supra note 280, at 30.
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Because divided government in the African context tends to be
crippling in its impact on the orderly administration of the state, a
reliance on that prospect as a way to check presidential imperialism in
Africa is misplaced. Restraining presidential power should not be
purchased at the cost of enfeebling government or paralyzing the
administration of the country. In fact, rather than leave open the
possibility of divided government, constitutional design in Africa
should minimize or eliminate that prospect. Instead, presidential
power might be better restrained through constitutional texts that
favor bright-line rules over discretionary or permissive language,
when it comes to defining the scope of executive power. The idea
here is for Africa's constitutional framers to be more definite or
specific in their delineation or enumeration of the scope and limits of
presidential power, rather than write the constitutional text in a way
that renders it unduly vulnerable to gamesmanship by power-
obsessed presidents and patronage-seeking legislators. As the recent
success of constitutionally imposed presidential term limits has
shown, constitution-based bright line rules, not extra-constitutional
political bargaining, are a more reliable way to check inordinate
presidential ambition in Africa's new democracies.
For example, if presidential appetite for excessive ministerial
appointments is the problem at hand, a more effective constitutional
remedy in the African context might be to prescribe a numerical limit
to the size of the president's ministerial contingent, as relying on
parliament to use its approval or legislative power to rein in the
president has proven ineffectual. It is precisely this approach-of
express prescription or proscription-that is reflected in the
provisions on presidential term limits in several of Africa's current
constitutions. Rather than leave presidential tenure open-ended, in
the hope and expectation that the normal democratic process would
end a president's tenure, consensus in Africa has firmed behind the
view that indefinite presidential terms are undesirable and that the
most effective way to end presidential tenure constitutionally is to
prescribe in the constitution the maximum number of terms a
president may serve. And that is exactly what most of Africa's new
constitutions do, and the results bear out the wisdom of that
approach. Other undesirable but entrenched tendencies in the use of
presidential power, such as unilateral presidential creation of
ministries or cross-branch appointment of legislators, might respond
best to similar direct proscription or regulation in the constitutional
text.
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Changing the orientation and behavior of parliamentary parties
is also critical to restoring effective balance of power in legislature-
president relations. The challenge here is to overcome the absence of
"internal democracy" in Africa's political parties. Dissenters and
nonconformists, particularly within Africa's governing parties, are
routinely sanctioned, and oftentimes expelled, by their party
leadership-and often for opposing the party's president. Internal
party constitutions and rules tend to be highly authoritarian in their
impulses and effects, giving party oligarchs the ability to limit
participation and discussion within the party. Encouragingly, certain
African constitutions, notably Ghana's and Uganda's, contain
provisions addressing the issue of internal party democracy, thus
signaling that political parties are not to be regarded as private clubs
outside the reach of public regulation and control. However, the
vague generalities in which these provisions are couched have failed
to provide sufficiently specific guidance for compliance or
enforcement. Constitutional design in Africa can help address the
problem of internal party democracy by imposing clear and specific
obligations and restraints on parties and, then, granting party
members (as well as independent election commissions) the right to
enforce such constitutional obligations through judicial or
administrative action. For example, specific constitutional rules
regulating the process of party candidate selection for presidential
and legislative elections and defining the scope and limits of parties'
disciplinary powers and procedures would better promote internal
democracy within Africa's political parties than vaguely-worded
provisions requiring parties to "conform to democratic principles."31'
Opening up Africa's political parties to greater participation and
influence by rank-and-file membership is necessary to tame the
oligarchic tendencies in parties that make it easier for presidents to
control the party and its legislative representatives.
B. The Judiciary and the "Fourth Branch" of Government
What about the courts, ombudsmen, auditors-general,
anticorruption agencies, and other extra-parliamentary institutions in
the current African constitutional landscape? Why have these other
institutions of horizontal accountability been unable to rein in
presidential imperialism in post-authoritarian Africa? We begin with
the courts.
311. GHANA CONST. art. 55(5) (1992).
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In a sense, the contemporary African approach to promoting
constitutionalism has been simply to "judicialize" it. Thus a
disproportionate weight of the burden of limiting presidential power
in post-authoritarian Africa is left to constitutional litigation and
judicial enforcement of the constitution. Bills of rights and
constitutional courts and supreme courts with constitutional review
authority are thus de rigueur in post-transition Africa.
Correspondingly, Africa's constitutional review courts have been
thrust into the role of "guardians of the constitution," and a number
of Africa's new constitutions have liberalized standing requirements
in order to encourage the public to challenge offending governmental
actions.
In part, the judicialization of constitutionalism in Africa follows a
global pattern."' But it also reflects the disproportionate influence of
Africa's lawyers, both individually and as a class, in the agitation for
reform and the ensuing process of constitution making and revision.
Belief in the possibilities of "juridical constitutionalism" '313 in Africa
might also stem from the view, widespread especially within African
legal communities, that weak-kneed judiciaries were largely to blame
for the failure of early postcolonial constitutionalism in Africa. The
opinion expressed recently by an African human rights lawyer, that
"the first generation of the Constitutions and Bills of Rights in
Common Law Africa was destroyed not so much by the intolerance
of the executive as by the enthusiastic abdication of judicial
responsibilities by the persons and institutions mandated by those
Constitutions to perform them,"" ' is one that is shared, curiously, by
many.315 Judgments rendered by Africa's early courts in cases like Re
312. See generally THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (Neal Tate &
Thorsten Allinder eds., 1995). See also RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARD JURISTOCRACY: THE
ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004); HERMAN
SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST
EUROPE (2000).
313. I use the term to describe a constitutional policy that relies primarily on the
prospect of constitutional litigation and judicial enforcement of rights as the primary
means of restraining government. See Prempeh, Marbury in Africa, supra note 47, at 1295.
314. Chidi Anslem Odinkalu, The Judiciary and the Legal Protection of Human Rights
in Common Law Africa: Allocating Responsibility for the Failure of Post-Independence
Bills of Rights, 8 AFR. SOC'Y OF INT'L & COMP. L. PROC. 124, 136-37 (1996).
315. See, e.g., T. PETER OMARI, KWAME NKRUMAH: THE ANATOMY OF AN AFRICAN
DICTATORSHIP 13 (1970) ("Three things must be held responsible for... the Ghanaian's
loss of liberty under [the 1960] Constitution-President Nkrumah, the Justices of the
Supreme Court and Parliament. Of these three, the judiciary must take most of the
blame.").
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Akoto (from Nkrumah's Ghana) and Ex parte Matovu 36 (from Milton
Obote's Uganda) are often cited to support this opinion."7 Following
from this assessment, Africa's courts, now bearing explicit
constitutional review powers and blessed with formal independence,
are expected to rise to their new responsibility as the first line of
defense against executive overreaching.
In some respects, the optimists have not been disappointed.
Africa's newly empowered courts have ruled against obstinate
presidents in several important cases litigated since the beginning of
the 1990s.318 Yet, despite these early indications of constitutionalism-
friendly judicial activism in contemporary Africa, Africa's courts are
still too enfeebled to be counted upon reliably to check presidential
power.
Judiciaries across Africa suffer many of the same handicaps that
undermine legislative effectiveness.319 The finance ministry's control
of the treasury, which in many African countries has been reinforced
immensely by current "cash budget" laws,32° essentially places the
judiciary at the financial mercy of the executive. Routine and gross
under-funding of Africa's courts often cause chief justices to adopt
various informal routes of influencing the executive in order to obtain
the resources necessary to keep the courts functioning. Turning the
judicial leadership into supplicants before government politicians
carries an obvious risk to judicial independence.32'
316. Uganda v. Comm'r of Prisons: Ex Parte Matovu [1966] E.A.L.R. 514. (upholding
unilateral and extraconstitutional abolition of Uganda's 1962 constitution by then prime
minister Milton Obote and his subsequent installation of a new 1966 constitution).
317. See, e.g., Nana Asante Bediatuo, The Presidential Model and Constitutionalism in
Ghana, STATESMAN (n.d.) available at http://www.thestatesmanonline.com/pages/news-
detail.php?newsid=3856&section=9 (charging the Ghana Supreme Court in the Re Akoto
case with "complete abdication of inherent judicial responsibility.")
318. Prempeh, supra note 51, at 1241-42 & n.15 (referring to selected cases).
319. See, e.g., S.K. Asare, Accounting for Judicial Performance in an Emerging
Democracy-Lessons from Ghana, 4 U. BOTSWANA L.J. 57 (2006) (discussing internal
problems undermining judicial effectiveness in Ghana).
320. Many African governments, under pressure from their international financiers,
have moved to "cash budgets," which means that the amount of lawfully appropriated
funds that is actually disbursed or released to a designated agency depends on the inflow
of tax revenues during the relevant period.
321. This risk is heightened in many African countries by the extraordinary
administrative power chief justices exert over their court systems and judicial personnel.
In Ghana, for example, a longstanding judicial convention, with no basis the national
constitution, but which likely stems from a similar power once exercised by the Lord
Chancellor of England allows the chief justice to select, single-handedly, any five justices
of the supreme court to sit in judgment on any case filed before the court. See P.S.
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But even if judicial independence in contemporary Africa were
secure, reliance on the judiciary to restrain presidential power would
run into yet another problem. This is the problem of jurisprudence-
of the body of judicial doctrine and associated presumptions
embedded in extant case law. Often what might appear to the
uncritical eye as a problem of "bad judges" (of "timorous souls, '3 22 in
Lord Denning's famous words) is, in reality, a problem of "bad
jurisprudence"-of judicial doctrine and attitudes about power and
rights that derive from sources and contexts doctrinally at odds with
the present constitutional order. The result, in the African context, is
what I have called a "jurisprudence of executive supremacy",23--a
jurisprudence that is unduly deferential to executive power and, at
best, skeptical of "novel" claims rooted in modern conceptions of
constitutionalism. Thus, for example, courts in Anglophone Africa,
relying on archaic common law doctrine regarding the validity of so-
called "claw-back clauses,, 324 have continued to uphold against
constitutional challenges anti-press and anti-free speech statutes
enacted during the period of one-party rule,325 Thus narrowing the
legal space for robust journalism in African democracies.
In a sense, this is the judicial aspect of the problem of path
dependency in post-authoritarian Africa, of holding over to the
present era a pattern of judicial inclination and decision-making
developed and learned in the era of "constitutions without
constitutionalism." The problem is heightened by the fact that,
ATIYAH, LAW AND MODERN SOCIETY 17 (2d ed. 1995) (criticizing power of the Lord
Chancellor to "choose (in effect) which judges will hear cases" on the Court of Appeal or
House of Lords of England). This power of the chief justice extends to cases in the lower
courts and cases on appeal to the intermediate court. Because of the exceptional
vulnerability of African chief justices to executive influence (for the reasons stated
earlier), the vast administrative powers of a chief justice within the judicial establishment,
especially the power to assign and reassign cases, opens the door to improper executive
pressure.
322. Lord Denning's famous statement in Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., [1951] 1
All ER 426, that the progressive development of the common law requires judges to be
"bold spirits," not "timorous souls," appears to have influenced immensely the thinking of
Africa's common law lawyers (for whom Denning the Jurist is a sort of folk hero) and
especially on their views regarding judicial responsibility for the demise of
constitutionalism in postcolonial Africa.
323. See Prempeh, supra note 36.
324. See Chris Ogbondah, Democratization and the Media in West Africa: An Analysis
of Recent Constitutional and Legislative Reforms for Press Freedom in Ghana and Nigeria,
6 W. AFR. REV. 8 (2004).
325. See Prempeh, supra note 51, at 1310-22 (discussing problems of jurisprudence in
Africa's common law judiciaries).
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despite recent democratic and constitutional reforms, Africa's statute
books and criminal codes are filled with volumes of repressive laws
enacted in the early postcolonial period and by successive
authoritarian regimes. And Africa's "democratic" governments or
their compliant law enforcement agents have not been shy to use or
enforce some of these laws. In Malawi, for example, a Protected
Emblems and Names Act,326 in force since 1967, has been enforced
over fifteen times in the post-Banda era, to arrest or prosecute
journalists for insulting the president. Similarly, Zambia's Public
Order Act, which dates back to the colonial period, has been used
repeatedly in the post-Kaunda era to frustrate the associational and
related activities of parties opposed to the government of the ruling
Movement for Multiparty Democracy. Under circumstances such as
these, the policy of simply enumerating a list of constitutional rights
and then leaving it to future constitutional litigation and judicial
review to declare these laws unconstitutional or to bring them in
conformity with the demands of constitutionalism is one that is
fraught with the risk of a regressive jurisprudence.
A more effective approach to constitutional design in
contemporary Africa is to repeal ex ante-that is, by express
provision in the text of the constitution-those specific pieces or
classes of repressive legislation (such as press censorship, sedition and
criminal libel laws, and others tending toward the same purpose or
effect) upon which past authoritarian regimes relied for control. The
advantage of this approach is that it settles in advance the matter of
the unconstitutionality of these laws, thereby eliminating the risk of a
future court upholding as constitutional their continued enforcement
by the state. Including rights-friendly or power-restraining
"interpretive instructions" along with bills of rights, as the South
African constitution does,327 is yet another effective way to guide
326. The Act provides as follows:
Any person who does any act or utters any words or publishes any writing
calculated to or liable to insult, ridicule or to show disrespect to the President,
the National Flag, the Armorial Ensigns, the Public Seal, or any protected
emblem or protected likeness, shall be liable to a fine of 1,000 pounds and to
imprisonment for two years.
See RUTH WALDEN, INSULT LAWS: AN INSULT TO PRESS FREEDOM (2000).
327. Section 39(1) of the South African constitution states that:
When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based
on human dignity, equality and freedom;
(b) must consider international law; and
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judicial review of constitutional provisions in a direction consistent
with the values and norms of liberal constitutionalism.
The challenges facing Africa's new "fourth branch of
government" are no less daunting. The most obvious is the familiar
problem of institutional dependence on the good graces of the
executive for adequate funding and resources. By the very nature of
their constitutional or legislative mandates, these institutions-
ombudsmen, human rights commissions, inspectors-general, auditors-
general, etc.-are more likely than even the judiciary to be perceived
by the executive as "hostile." This naturally complicates their
resource deficiency problem. Moreover, these agencies of horizontal
accountability often have no independent enforcement authority;
their mandates usually limit them to investigating and reporting
findings to parliament and/or the executive. Prosecutorial discretion
in contemporary Africa generally remains the constitutional
monopoly of the Attorney-General, who is invariably a politician and
a member of the president's cabinet holding office at the pleasure of
the president.
In sum, when it comes to the allocation and specification of
power within the state, there is far too much wishful thinking, and not
enough hard-nosed realism, embedded in Africa's current
constitutions. The Madisonian insight, that a republican constitution
is a constitution for the governance of a political community by
"men," not "angels,''32 is one that appears not to have been heeded
by Africa's constitution makers. The singular success of presidential
(c) may consider foreign law.
Section 36 also provides that:
1. The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom,
taking into account all relevant factors, including
a. the nature of the right;
b. the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
c. the nature and extent of the limitation;
d. the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
e. less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
In addition, section 233 requires a court, when interpreting legislation, to "prefer any
reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over
any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law."
328. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 246-47 (James Madison) (David Wooton ed., 2003).
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term limits in reversing the tradition of presidential self-perpetuation
in contemporary Africa carries an important lesson for constitutional
design in Africa: flat prohibitions and bright line rules, not grants of
open-ended or discretionary authority, hold far better prospects for
taming presidential power and advancing constitutionalism in Africa's
emerging democracies.
Conclusion
Writing about Ghana in 1994, a year into its fourth republic and
almost three decades after the overthrow of its first leader, political
scientist Yakubu Saaka329 observed, disapprovingly, that,
Nkrumah and what his era established are the fundamental
basis of contemporary politics in Ghana .... [TIhe most
important facets of Ghanaian politics, it seems, have been
conditioned by the Nkrumah period. Parliamentary affairs and
conduct,.. . the position of the judiciary vis-A-vis the other arms
of government, perceptions of the presidency and its
incumbent; all these and similar considerations, actions, and
orientations are viewed, judged, and measured against what
when on in that earlier period. 3
What is true of Ghana remains regrettably true of its sister states
in the rest of Africa. Despite recent popular rejection of presidential
autocracy in several African states and the resultant reconstitution of
government along democratic lines, politics and government in
Africa's democratizing polities, and in particular the exercise of
presidential power, continue to follow the path and patterns of the
ancien r~gime, even if the overt excesses of the past have abated to
some extent. Recent constitutional reforms have installed electoral
democracy in many of Africa's once autocratically-governed states.
But progress toward constitutionalism remains hostage to persistent
presidential omnipotence.
Contemporary constitutional design in Africa has been especially
inattentive to the reality that the extant political tradition of imperial
presidency has acquired a life of its own and thus will not easily be
overcome by passive or open-ended constitutional provisions.
Presidential imperialism has survived recent counter-authoritarian
329. Professor Yakubu Saaka was himself a deputy minister in the short-lived, pro-
Nkrumah government of the People's National Party (1979-1981).
330. Yakubu Saaka, Recurrent Themes in Ghanaian Politics: Kwame Nkrumah's
Legacy, 24 J. BLACK STUDs. 263, 263 (1994).
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transitions and regime change in Africa partly because Africa's new
constitutions have, oftentimes by omission, left presidents free to
exploit to their advantage their reservoir of political resources and
prerogatives embedded in the traditions and practices of the ancien
r~gime.
The Great Man theory33' has had its day in Africa. It has not
served Africa well. Africa needs to move beyond reliance on the
illusion of heroic leadership. What Africa needs, above all, are
strong, capable states332 -"service states" that are built on a
foundation of effective, law-governed and functioning institutions and
that serve, not lord over, the citizenry. Presidential leadership,
however benign or visionary, cannot substitute for such institutions.
Rather, presidential leadership must support and strengthen, not
stymie the institutions of state-the institutions that must endure long
after leaders have left. As former Brazilian President Fernando
Henrique Cardoso has observed, "Perhaps the best use that
statesmen can make of political acumen in such moments [of
transition] is precisely that of making their nations less reliant on
themselves and more dependent on institutions. '  Africa's current
transition to democracy offers an opportunity for precisely that kind
of presidential statesmanship."'34
331. The Great Man Theory views history as "the biography of great men." See
THOMAS CARLYLE, ON HEROES, HERO-WORSHIP AND THE HEROIC IN HISTORY (1843).
For much of its postcolonial history, the story of Africa has indeed been the story of its
"Big Men."
332. Ake, supra note 76, at 88 ("The state in Africa needs to become both leaner and
stronger in order to carry out successfully its essential developmental tasks.").
333. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Scholarship and Statesmanship, 16 J. DEMOCRACY
5, 12 (2005).
334. See Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, The Challenges of Leadership in Post-Conflict Africa:
The Case of Liberia, The 2006 Oppeinheimer Lecture at the International Inst. for
Strategic Studies, London (May 31, 2006), available at http://www.iiss.org/conferences/
recent-key-addresses/oppenheimer-lecture---ellen-johnson-sirleaf (it behooves Africa's
new generation of leaders to "take the lead in dismantling the imperial Presidency").
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